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Chapter I: Introduction
This thesis analyzes the interactions between the World Bank (hereafter, the
Bank) and the Cordillera Peoples Alliance (CPA), an indigenous and environmental
advocacy group based in the Cordillera region of Luzon, in the Philippines. Using data
gathered through both text-based and participatory research methods, I analyze the
discursive relationship and violent confrontations between the two organizations.
Conflicting development and human rights values cause the majority of these conflicts. I
focus on how each organization enacts development and human rights, and how this leads
to conflict. Ultimately, I intend for this thesis to offer practical guidance for the reader
involved in development or human rights work.
Tracing the interactions of a global multilateral organization and an indigenous
peoples advocacy organization is easier said than done. To facilitate my analysis I use
two pairs of oppositional terms: the state and the non-governmental organization (NGO),
and consensus and policy. Each opposition reveals a field of conflict between the
organizations that might have otherwise gone unnoticed. These pairs are not perfect:
scholars do not universally recognize the validity of the oppositions I have presented.
The reader should view these pairs as an imperfect tool that reveals significant underlying
aspects of the CPA-Bank relationship.
I find these pairs useful for several reasons. The body of this thesis focuses on
human rights and development in practice in the Cordillera region of the Philippines. I
use the policy-consensus contrast to approach how the Bank and CPA enact human rights
and development. The Bank is a bureaucratic, hierarchical institution. It implements its
development strategy though policy—rules established by a bureaucracy to govern those
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under its control because the bureaucracy believes it has a greater ability to govern its
subjects than they do themselves. I will argue that this development practice violently
conflicts with the human rights tactics of the CPA, which it implements through
consensus-based networks.
The other pair of concepts that I use, the state and the NGO, reveals several
significant aspects of the relationship between states, intergovernmental organizations,
and NGOs. Drawing upon the work of several scholars (Fisher 1995, Graeber 2004), I
view the dualistic and changing nature of the contemporary state as a fundamental
underlying factor in global power relations. NGOs have evolved in relation to the state,
and these changes play a major role in Bank-CPA conflict in the Cordillera, as well as in
the discourse the two organizations produce. Globalization has created a new
transnational forum for NGO activism, and this forum lies beyond the reach of the state.
This arena allows for new NGO advocacy tactics, but it has also prompted a strong state
response to this newfound power, as the conflict as the Cordillera demonstrates.
Ultimately, my analysis of the Bank-CPA conflict aims to delineate a role for
anthropology to engage, and perhaps deescalate, the CPA-Bank struggle, and perhaps
other similar clashes around the globe. I recognizes conflicts as inherent to NGO-state
relations. Yet this tension need not result in violence, as it has in the Cordillera.
Anthropology can facilitate more effective communication between states ad NGOs.
Anthropology can also help create more effective consensus-based networks. If
constructed effectively, such networks can grow within a world controlled by policybased institutions.

4
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Outline

In the following chapter, I begin by presenting the research methods used in this
thesis. In addition to sources cited in the literature review, I base my assertions on a
unique history of participatory research with Bank and CPA officials in both the United
States and the Philippines. This overview of my research methods, will help the reader
contextualize the conclusions of this thesis.
The third chapter of the thesis begins by exploring the meaning of human rights,
an important area of discursive conflict between the Bank and CPA. I then discuss in
detail each of the oppositional pairs that I use in the rest of thesis. In current literature
standard definitions of the terms I use do not exist. I devote time to each of these paired
concepts, paying particular attention to their relevance for the inherent conflict within the
NGO-state relationship.
In Chapter Four I present a history of the Cordillera, exploring the factors that
have produced current political violence and tensions between the CPA and the World
Bank. The chapter also looks at the instability of the Philippine state and the complicated
relationship between the Philippines and the United States, both of which are important
contributing factors in Bank-CPA tensions.
Building on this historical context, the fifth chapter, “The Rise of the CPA,” looks
at how this history has produced the current cycle of violence and human rights violations
in the Cordillera. This chapter considers the questions of identity raised by the ongoing
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conflict between the CPA and the Bank, and it discusses how these issues are rooted in
tensions arising from the NGO-state relationship.
The sixth chapter focuses on the World Bank. I describe the entry of the Bank
into the Philippines and the Bank’s relationship with civil society organizations (CSOs). 1
I look at the Bank’s relationship with civil society by analyzing the discourse the Bank
produces in its publications about its civil society programs and through the use of
interview data. This discourse highlights two different methods of promoting human
rights and development: policy implementation and the consensus process. The policy
and consensus models form a complicated, dynamic relationship. At times they support
one another to create more effective development and human rights frameworks, but in
the Cordillera policy and consensus conflict violently. Ultimately, I question whether it
is possible for both systems to function concurrently under present conditions in the
Cordillera.
In the seventh chapter I look more closely at the violent confrontations between
the Bank and the CPA. I also address rhetorical attacks the organizations make against
one another. In discussing these attacks, I consider the NGO’s mission to do good and
remain non-political. The chapter explores both the Bank’s and the CPA’s attempts to
build their credibility, and the methods they use to discredit one another.

In this thesis I use non-governmental organization (NGO) and civil society organization
(CSO) almost interchangeably. In fact, they are not always considered interchangeable
terms. “CSO” is generally regarded to include a wider swath of organizations, such as
informal organizations and religious groups, while many of the scholars cited in this
thesis define NGOs more narrowly, as incorporated organizations whose mission focuses
on the public good. The Bank uses the term CSO rather than NGO throughout its
literature. For the purposes of my analysis, this distinction is unnecessary; for both CSOs
and NGOs I regard their oppositional relationship to the government as their most
important defining characteristic.

1
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In the final chapter, I explore the role of anthropology in establishing and
implementing human rights standards and fostering development. Cross-cultural
communication remains one of the primary difficulties within the worlds of development
and human rights. I argue that anthropologists must participate in transnational NGO
networks if valid global human rights are to be established. Through involvement in these
networks, anthropologists can provide ethnographic experience to improve the efficacy of
transnational human rights networks.

Robbins
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Chapter II: Methodological Reflections

In September 2006 I began working at Colby as the Research Assistant of Joan
Carling, Chairperson of the CPA. She arrived that fall as a Fellow of the Oak Institute
for the Study of International Human Rights at Colby. Research experience in the
Philippines during summer 2005 and experience in human rights advocacy work
provided an important background for this work. I also enrolled in the class she taught
that fall, “Indigenous Peoples and Human Rights.” This previous exposure provides
familiarity with the organization, and a deeper understanding of its mission and the
Philippine context. In an attempt to utilize these resources, I began researching, with
Mary Beth Mills as my thesis advisor, transnational human rights NGO networking,
using the CPA as a case study. Midway through the research process the literature
review shifted its focus on the Philippines and expanded to include the more general role
of transnational NGOs in establishing human rights standards. A lack of data focusing on
human rights organizations in the Philippines, as well as a failure to locate literature
written from an anthropological perspective precipitated this change. To provide field
data for this research, I intended to travel to the Philippines and work with the CPA for
the month of January.
A serious methodological complication occurred when I was unable to secure
funding for my fieldwork in the Philippines because of security concerns. As a substitute
for this fieldwork, I received support from the Goldfarb Center for Public Affairs and
Civic Engagement to conduct a series of interviews with officials at public and private
organizations dealing with human rights issues in Washington, D.C. To supplement
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these interviews, I also arranged interviews with officials in human rights-related
positions at the World Bank and in Minneapolis. The interviews at the World Bank
revealed significant issues in the fields of human rights and development, so I refocused
the thesis to examine Bank-CPA interactions.
The change from a field-work based investigation to reliance on interviews led to
an additional shift in the project, from a single focus on the CPA and the concept of
human rights in the Philippines to a project centered on two organizations, the World
Bank and the CPA. 2 It is important to consider not only that the two organizations differ
drastically in terms of size, regional focus, structure, and political influence, but that they
also work towards very different missions. The CPA focuses on indigenous and human
rights issues in its mission statement, while The Bank’s primary focus is global economic
development. The organizations also differ drastically in that the Bank is an intergovernmental organization with a multi-billion dollar budget rather than an NGO, while
the CPA is a Fourth World advocacy organization. Despite these differences, I will
demonstrate that the oppositional pairs that provide the analytical framework of this
thesis remain relevant to all organizations.

Data Sources

I draw from several sources of information to support this thesis, including
significant personal experience with the CPA. The data sources for this thesis include:
2

This thesis is aided by research and interviews conducted at other NGOs, including the
Center for Victims of Torture (a Minneapolis-based NGO) and the University of
Minnesota Human Rights Center.
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interviews with officials at the World Bank, Department of State, and University of
Minnesota Human Rights Center; journal notes from study in the Philippines before the
conception of this project; observations from class with Joan Carling, as well as
observations of her lectures and other advocacy work while at Colby; printed and online
media obtained from the subject organizations; and a review of relevant literature. Such
an approach has allowed me to develop a holistic, multi-angle approach to this thesis.
Work with Joan Carling and observation of her class allowed for participatory
observation of her advocacy work. While I do not directly cite my observations from this
class in this thesis, they have informed my approach to the CPA’s advocacy methods.
My experience with her helped me understand the political position of the CPA, and the
networking mechanisms it uses in its attempt to affect human rights, environmental, and
indigenous peoples policy, both in the Philippines and globally. The work with her
granted me access to parts of the human rights network that would have otherwise gone
unnoticed, including her academic and personal connections that enabled her to be a more
effective lobbyist for her organization within the United States. While I rarely directly
cite this experience in the body of this thesis, much of the background information I have
provided is based on my experience working with Joan. If I had not had access to this
important connection and data source, current published literature would have failed to
provide sufficient data for many areas of this thesis.
My experience in the Philippines during 2005, supported by a Freeman
Foundation research grant, offered an important perspective into the functioning of
Philippine politics. I witnessed an attempt, led by a coalition of leftist NGOs, to oust
President Arroyo. This movement allowed me to observe the oligarchic nature of
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Philippine politics, the political power of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), the
involvement of the United States in domestic politics, and the political involvement of
NGOs. At the time, most Filipinos believed that if either the United States or the AFP
were to withdraw for President Arroyo she would be forced from power. During this
time I also witnessed how the killings of leftist political activists created a climate of fear
among Filipino NGO workers. 3
These two experiences have created a personal sympathy for the CPA and other
Philippine NGO groups. My experience in the Philippines and work with Joan Carling
cast Bank projects in an extremely negative light, and I agree with many of their
criticisms of multilateral development institutions. However, my time in the Philippines
also revealed many of the inefficiencies of advocacy organizations, and the problems
resulting from opposition to Bank projects without realistic alternatives.
This thesis draws significantly on my analysis of legal scholarship and
international relations sources. These fields focus on states as the primary actors in
global conflicts and ultimately see the threat of state violence as the final arbiter in
human rights disputes. States, and their legal systems do play a very significant role in
establishing human rights standards, but actions taken by individuals, multinational
corporations, and NGOs must be considered as well. Areas where human rights
violations occur, such as the Cordillera, often are geographically and socially distant from
the cosmopolitan centers where formal systems of power are based. Local nongovernmental actors must not be ignored.

3

For example, I met several activists who had received death threats and were living in
hiding.
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In response to the difficulties of reconciling this literature with an anthropological
perspective, I constructed the two oppositional pairs to focus this thesis on several
meaningful aspects of Bank-CPA conflict. The two pairs of oppositional terms discussed
above emerged from the diverse body of literature reviewed in the previous section.
None of the pairs was pre-established within that literature; rather, the pairs emerged out
of my reading of multiple authors. Within a body of research that covers conflicting
regional, global, and theoretical perspectives, honing in on these contrasts has allowed
me to focus this research in a way that would have otherwise been impossible. While my
analyses of the Bank, CPA, and the US-Philippine relationship are in many ways
incomplete, the attention to these pairs I have constructed allows for a more productive
focus on their interactions, and it helps elucidate the role of anthropology in the fields of
development and human rights.
However, complications have arisen because of the use of these oppositional
pairs. While I treat each pair as oppositional in my approach to this project, NGOs and
the state, policy and consensus, and politics and “doing good” are not universally
recognized as oppositional terms. In fact, interviewees have taken issue with my use of
them in this manner. Several of the scholars cited in this study would similarly dispute
my analytical perspective. But I do not consider this to be a convincing reason to
abandon my approach. Most of the terms involved, including “NGO,” “human rights,”
and the state, are not clearly defined in scholarly literature. No common definition of any
of the terms exists among the scholars cited in this thesis, which is why I have included
my explorations of the meaning of these terms above. While some might dispute this
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approach, evidence from this case study in the Philippines demonstrates that these
oppositions shape the CPA-Bank relationship.
I have established this set of definitions for use in the ongoing conflicts in the
Cordillera. In this context, my definitions are meaningful and descriptive of the situation
on the ground. They are based on an analysis of local conditions, so while interviewees
might have disputed the applicability of my definitions or series of contrasts in the
contexts of their organizations, one must remember that legalized human rights ideals do
not translate cleanly into local contexts, nor is there any general pattern for the enactment
of human rights. This is not a study of human rights ideals, it is a study of human rights
and development practice in the Cordillera.
I conducted research interviews over a two week span in January 2007. Three of
the four interviews, the two at the Bank and one at the Department of State are cited in
this thesis. The fourth interview at the University of Minnesota Human Rights Center
provided important background information but is not quoted here. Just as my
experience in the Philippines helped contextualize the text-based data I had obtained
about human rights and politics in the Philippines, the interview data helped reveal how
the Bank’s relationship with CSOs, laid out in numerous publications, actually functions.
The interviews revealed the roles of Bank employees in otherwise incomprehensible
bureaucratic processes.
The interview at the Department of State provided much important research data.
The interview was not for attribution and was not recorded. The official had met with
Joan Carling, the Chairperson of the CPA, to discuss human rights concerns in the
Philippines. The official was very knowledgeable about human rights issues specific to
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the Philippines and participated in drafting the State Department’s Country Report on
Human Rights for the Philippines. The official also corresponded regularly with the US
embassy in Manila, and closely followed events in the Philippines. Consequently, the
interviewee was very aware of the ongoing political violence and the nuances of the
American-Philippine relationship. The interviewee seemed frustrated with the ongoing
political violence, and sympathized with the CPA, revealing an important aspect of the
US-CPA relationship. The interview lasted almost an hour.
I also interviewed Dr. David Freestone, Deputy General Council, Advisory
Services, and Siobhan McInerney, a subordinate colleague of his who focuses exclusively
on human rights law. I recorded the interview. Dr. Freestone, dominated the interview,
referring to Ms. McInerney only to elaborate on issues he was unfamiliar with. The
interview focused on the Bank’s human rights obligations under international law, the
legal and political implications of its contractual obligations to member states. At the
beginning of the interview, both interviewees voiced their disagreement with the two
oppositional pairs around which this thesis is based, particularly with the assumption that
the state and the NGO occupy inherently conflicting positions. Considering the Bank’s
expanding partnerships with civil society, such a position would suggest the Bank is
neglecting its contractual obligations to its member states. However, Dr. Freestone and
Ms. McInerney maintained cordial attitudes throughout the course of the interview.
Referring to our theoretical disagreement, Dr. Freestone joked, “As a Bank employee of
course I disagree, but you probably don’t care as long as your anthropology department
likes it.” Despite our differing orientations, Dr. Freestone very effectively outlined the
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difficult position of the Bank in relation to NGOs and its member states, and in later
sections I have drawn significantly from his analysis. The interview lasted 35 minutes.
Dr. Freestone referred me to another Bank colleague, Carolyn Reynolds,
Coordinator of the Global Civil Society Team. Ms. Reynolds similarly disputed the two
contrasting pairs presented in this thesis. She argued that the Bank’s work with CSOs
aided the development process in its member states. She provided extensive information
regarding the Bank’s orientation to NGOs, and described the dynamics that develop
within Bank-NGO partnerships. She took a less legalistic perspective than Dr. Freestone,
and was much more knowledgeable about global civil society. Ms. Reynolds had little
time to spare for our interview, but it nonetheless has provided much of the data upon
which the Bank-CPA conflict section is based. She also provided me with numerous
Bank publications, some of which she had authored. The combination of the text data
she supplied and her oral analysis of these documents offered important insights into
Bank discourse of civil society. I recorded the interview, and it lasted 33 minutes.
The use of multiple research methods has led to a better understanding of the
literature review. My experience in the Philippines has given me an understanding of the
political and human rights situation there that would have otherwise been unattainable.
Genuine fear has deeply penetrated the activist community and leftist political groups.
Furthermore, the Philippine political situation is much more volatile than politics in the
United States: since the 1980s, two presidents have been toppled by popular protests, and
all have faced serious coup attempts. My presence in the Philippines during the JulyAugust 2005 allowed me to witness an unsuccessful popular attempt to oust Gloria
Arroyo. Now I better appreciate the instability of her position and her dependence on
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both American support and her need for support from the AFP. It is widely believed
among Filipinos that if either were to withdraw active support for her administration
either a military coup or popular revolution would occur. Without first-hand experience
in the Philippines, I would not appreciate the complexities of the US-Philippine
relationship.
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Chapter II: Literature Review

This chapter establishes a new understanding of transnational non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and human rights advocacy by exploring key themes in the
relevant literature. I define these terms by arranging them in a series of two oppositional
pairs: policy vs. consensus, and the state vs. the NGO. These oppositional pairs reveal
contradictions within contemporary human rights and development processes, and they
also help define the role of anthropology within transnational human rights advocacy.
Later chapters, which describe CPA-Bank interactions, will illustrate how these pairs are
useful in investigations of human rights advocacy.
First, I define human rights conceptually and pragmatically. To do so I will draw
from an interdisciplinary body of literature. Anthropology provides a key conceptual
guide to the interactions of culture and human rights, but current anthropological
literature primarily focuses on how the cultural meaning of human rights is articulated
within specific contexts (see Messer 1993, Wright 1988). Analyzing cultural meaning in
singular contexts is necessary to understanding the globalization of human rights, but
perhaps more important to all actors are the political effects of this process, and how the
daily lives of people involved are tangibly affected by development and human rights
policy. Political science more comprehensively documents global policy changes as a
result of NGO human rights advocacy (See Korey 1998), so this thesis draws extensively
from political science literature in its investigation of human rights practice.
Following the discussion of human rights, this chapter will explore the first major
contradiction that arises in transnational NGO work— policy and consensus. My
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understanding of policy derives from Graeber (2004) and Silvey (2004), who both write
that policy is produced by hierarchical, political institutions. Graeber continues that
policy is by definition imposed by the powerful on the less-powerful (Graeber 2004). In
contrast, the consensus process functions informally, and is not officially based on
hierarchical relations. This pair of terms serves as a gateway to understanding how
human rights standards are implemented: the consensus process represents the
functioning of informal transnational NGO networks, while states and inter-governmental
organizations (e.g. the World Bank) enact Silvey and Graeber’s concept of policy.
The second pair explored below is the contrast between the state and the NGO.
The functions, and therefore the de facto definition of the state, are constantly in flux as
global informational and political flows redefine state boundaries. Because of this
perpetual change, the space defined as “non-governmental” fluctuates correspondingly.
This section of the thesis will delineate the conceptual relationship between the state and
the NGO, while acknowledging that their functions change constantly in practice. It will
also question the assumption of the statist world order that defines non-governmental
organizations.

Human Rights in Perspective

“Human rights” is not a clearly defined term. This section will attempt to clarify
its meaning by providing a concise history of the term’s construction and entry into
international discourse. I will also briefly mention two perspectives on the relationship
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between anthropology and human rights. Here, I intend background the discussions of
human rights in the NGO world presented later in this thesis.
“Human rights” appears frequently in academic discourse and in the mass media.
Innumerable NGOs claim to promote human rights as well. But the term’s meaning
varies depending on the context in which it is used. The most prominent and
authoritative definition of human rights is presented by the United Nations, an
organization that claims global legitimacy and represents almost all states. The preamble
of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) states: “Whereas
recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members
of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world” (United
Nations 1948). But this introduction gives little guidance to what human rights are in
daily contexts, and how they are enacted. Other than the UDHR itself, there is little
elaboration by the United Nations about how the concept of human rights must be
interpreted and applied. Scholars have attempted to summarize the UDHR, stating:
“Building on a foundation of natural law, political agreements, the UN concept of human
rights acknowledges that in all times and places, reasonable people, regardless of political
affiliation, demand certain minimum standards of behavior toward their own citizens”
(Luard 1967, Paraphrased in Messer 1993). Aside from a handful of treaties targeted
toward specific abuses, these standards remain unclear.
Nonetheless, the UDHR (quoted above) is widely accepted as a human rights
standard, but its interpretation varies widely, depending on context. Messer notes that
Western states focus on political and civil rights, socialist states advocate for labor and
welfare rights, while many Third World and Asian states frame economic growth as a
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right that takes precedence over other rights such as civil liberties(1993). Varying
concepts of rights take precedence from one context to the next, so even though human
rights as an ideal may be universal, its implementation is not. Furthermore,
anthropologists have generally been absent from the debate about the cultural
implications of global human rights standards. Research for this study has revealed the
lack of anthropological writing in journals focusing on human rights, such as Human
Rights Quarterly. Anthropology publications do address the concept of human rights, but
they give little guidance on what role anthropology should play in promoting human
rights, if it should engage the field at all.
Despite the failure of the United Nations and other formal international bodies to
develop a standardized global understanding of human rights, and the failure of
anthropology to provide any actionable, scholarly guidance, transnational NGOs have
begun to apply their own standards of human rights on the global scale. Amnesty
International, Human Rights Watch, and other human rights NGOs now claim to apply
uniform human rights standards globally, and their advocacy reaches a global audience.
Sally Engle Merry writes that culture circulates globally, and asserts that human rights, as
a concept, is part of this flow (Merry 2006). In speaking of the application of human
rights ideas internationally, Merry notes that a great diversity exists within the process of
establishing human rights standards. To become accepted within specific cultural
contexts, international human rights standards, which are often based on UN treaties,
must draw from indigenous ideas to gain local credibility. But this process is a careful
balancing act: NGOs can not deviate too far from standard, Western human rights
language because of the risk of offending their Western donors and other Western
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stakeholders. Merry describes multiple forms of this process, which she calls
vernacularization (2006).

Consensus and Policy

Policy drives the world’s governments and multilateral organizations; policy
being top-down regulations enforced through legalistic means by hegemonic institutions.
I will not present much evidence to support this claim because I believe it to be self
evident. Since Hammurabi, laws, and policy to enforce them, have formed the basis of
government. The government subjects citizens to policy in most aspects of life, from the
Department of Motor Vehicles to the State Department. Multilateral organizations such
as the UN create international policy, which is implemented on the global level. But as
Silvey writes(2004), states and multilateral organizations have done a poor job in
enforcing human rights policy over global entities, such as multinational corporations.
By definition states legitimately enact policy within their own territories, but the one
multilateral hierarchical institution active in the human rights arena that claims global
legitimacy, the United Nations, has not established actionable human rights policy
(discussed in the Human Rights section). NGOs have attempted to fill the gaps in policydriven human rights enforcement through establishing human rights standards through
the consensus process.
In practice, human rights is not a concise, clearly defined idea but the product of a
multiplicity of forces that constantly redefines it. The practice of human rights includes a

Robbins 22
wide variety of actors, including states, intergovernmental-organizations, corporations,
NGOs, and academics, and I will argue that it is a process of consensus. The constant reestablishment of human rights standards through translation by NGOs (Merry 2006), 4 as
outlined above, occurs in an unregulated, intangible space. From Graeber’s perspective,
the lack of hierarchical, institutional enforcement would legitimize human rights as a
philosophy. Graeber has a joined a history of anarchist scholars (Bakunin, Chomsky,
Proudhon) in writing that the consensus process, based on self-organization and voluntary
organization, is as basic as the human condition (Graeber 2004).
Graeber discusses consensus as an interpersonal process that functions best
among small groups of people, but the similarities between informal NGO networking,
outlined by several scholars below, and the consensus process, outlined by Graeber, are
too clear to ignore. In defining consensus, Graeber identifies two levels of objection:
“one can ‘stand aside,’ which is to say ‘I don’t like this and won’t participate but I
wouldn’t stop anyone from doing it,’ or ‘block,’ which has the effect of a veto. One can
only block if one feels a proposal is a violation of the fundamental principles for reasons
for being of a group” (Graeber 2004). The level of participation in a movement
responding to a human rights violation by a corporation or other actor is determined by
the number of NGOs who attempt to veto actions that they view as violating human
rights norms. 5 By having each group apply their own definition of human rights norms
to corporate behavior, each group can choose to block human rights violations as it sees
4

NGO is not precise in this context. NGOs are composed of individuals, and this research is based upon
interviews with individuals who are employees of NGOs. I am taking data from these interviews and then
generalizing about the behavior of NGO as a whole.
5
After having written this section of the thesis, I came across a concise description of this process:
“Campaigns are sets of strategically linked activities in which members of a diffuse principled network…
develop explicit, visible ties and mutually recognized roles in pursuit of a common goal (and generally
against a common target).” (Keck and Sikkink p.6)
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fit. Human rights standards, consequently, are set by the ability of the responding NGOs
to prevent perceived human rights violations. If the number of NGOs attempting to block
perceived human rights violations succeeds, then new human rights expectations have
been set for corporations, states, or other actors.
This process does not formalize the human rights standards it produces, and
Graeber’s comment above speaks to human rights as an informal concept based on
abstract and evolving principles. In the consensus process, community principles form
the only legitimate basis for blocking an action. The strongest tools wielded by NGOs
are their moral credibility and social capital, which they use to define human rights as
principles fundamental to the human community. In the arena of human rights
especially, which claims to be anti-political, questions of faith in abstract principles rise
above precise standards clearly defined by hierarchical institutions. In their political
analysis of transnational activist networks, Keck and Sikkink note: “More than other
kinds of transnational actors, advocacy networks often reach beyond policy change to
advocate and instigate changes in the institutional and principled basis of international
interactions” (Keck and Sikkink 1997). Networks avoid advocating for changes in
institutionally-driven policy, and instead focus on shifting the principles that form the
foundations of these institutions. The informality of this process creates a tool well
suited to the global human rights arena.
NGOs form informal networks, and this decentralized, unregulated process also
mirrors the consensus process. Literature on corporate social responsibility addresses the
importance of informal networks, rather than hierarchy, in campaigns to hold
corporations to human rights standards. In describing the student anti-sweatshop
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movement, Naomi Klein writes: “Rather than a single movement, what is emerging is
thousands of movements intricately linked to one another… Thanks to the Net,
mobilizations are able to unfold with sparse bureaucracy and minimal hierarchy… What
is emerging is an activist model that mirrors the organic, decentralized, inter-linked
pathways of the internet”(Sadler 2004). Here Klein is addressing the advantages of
decentralization: standards are not rigidly defined, allowing movements to unfold, to
grow from the bottom, rather than be initiated from the top. Levels of participation vary
within such campaigns as movements form and disband around different issues, but such
fluctuation mirrors the methods of consensus outlined by Graeber.
If such a process effectively prevents human rights violations, the establishment
of global human rights standards by transnational NGOs represents the construction of a
new institution following the anarchist-consensus model. Discussing anarchism, Graeber
writes: “It is also a project, which sets out to begin creating the institutions of a new
society ‘within the shell of the old,’ to expose, subvert, and undermine structures of
domination but always, while doing so, proceeding in a democratic fashion, a manner
which itself demonstrates those structures are unnecessary”(Graeber 2004). Sadler
describes the emergence of new and effective standards of corporate citizenship produced
by civil regulation (Sadler 2004), which indeed represents the formation of a new societal
institution within pre-existing frameworks, a la Graeber. The regulation of corporate
behavior by transnational NGOs fits within law-driven policy methods of regulation
currently used by states. Space regulation by both the consensus and policy systems
exists because they function in different contexts, and use different tools to check
corporate behavior. Policy systems use legal penalties based on state power to enforce
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regulations within their own borders; transnational NGOs use their moral credibility
within the consensus process to enforce a soft-law 6 of shame by swaying global public
opinion. These two regimes do not inherently conflict with one another, allowing them to
coexist.
In her study of the student anti-sweatshop movement, Rachel Silvey also
identifies several elements of transnational labor rights activism that enforce human
rights standards established by the consensus process. Within this movement, Silvey
identifies a diverse, informal network of actors that challenges global standards of
corporate behavior. Actors include student groups, labor unions, and internationally
known human rights organizations (Silvey 2004). The actors within this movement are
truly diverse: they have different motives for participation, different labor rights
standards, and possibly even different desired outcomes. Despite these differences, they
have a common target: specific corporate labor practices that each organization sees as
violating its principles. They use their influence within their communities to sway public
opinion by shaming corporations that violated their standards of labor rights.
Considering the successes of groups such as student anti-sweatshop groups, it appears
that networks, and the consensus relationships on which they are based, proved much
more effective than international labor law, a policy established by a hierarchical
organization.
Other scholars discuss the implementation of human rights standards established
by NGO networks. Rory Sullivan, a legal scholar, notes the failure of regulatory
frameworks to ensure adequate labor rights practices by corporations on the global level
6

“Soft Law” typically refers to non-treaty, and therefore non-enforceable agreements between states.
However, authors cited in this thesis have used the term to refer to non-binding global standards established
by NGOs. See Korey (1998) for a more comprehensive definition.
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(Sullivan 2003). In strong states, legal frameworks adequately regulate corporate
behavior, but corporate behavior in international territory, as well as within weaker states,
falls beyond the jurisdiction of sufficiently powerful regulatory bodies. Sullivan writes:

The vision of the powerful sovereign state has become increasingly anachronistic
as government prerogatives have increasingly been limited or constrained by
developments such as rapid privatisation, free trade agreements and economic
integration. One of the specific concerns has been that many TNCs have
outgrown the ability of individual states to regulate them effectively (2003).

The limited reach of legal standards has opened a space for NGOs to involve themselves
in corporate regulation without conflicting with pre-existing state authority. Such a
process mimics Graeber’s understanding of the development of anarchist-inspired
institutions.
Sullivan continues that because of the failure of state-driven regulation, the vast
majority of human rights monitoring is conducted by NGOs. NGOs use their social
capital to sway public opinion against corporations that violate the human rights
standards informally established by NGO networks. NGOs often collaborate with
corporate partners to construct codes of conduct or pledges of social responsibility. In
describing these codes that govern corporate behavior, Sullivan states: “They are ‘softlaw’ instruments, whose primary method of enforcement is through the shame of nonadherence” (2003). That NGOs drive “soft-law” standards, and that these standards
transcend state borders, makes them an effective tool for implementing global human
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rights standards of corporate behavior. That transnational NGOs derive their power from
multinational constituencies makes them an effective system for tempering corporate
behavior. In contrast, state regulatory bodies are inherently limited in the scope of their
power.
Keck and Sikkink have identified a similar model of how NGO networks use the
consensus process to enforce standards. They analyze networks as bodies that
communicate information, and then disseminate this information to influence wider
discourse. “To influence discourse, procedures, and policy, activists may engage and
become part of larger policy communities that group actors working on an issue from a
variety of institutional and value perspectives”(Keck and Sikkink 1997). NGOs use their
social capital and moral credibility to reframe human rights abuses within wider public
discourse as actions that violate not only the principles of the NGO, but as actions that
violate the most fundamental principles of society as well 7 . I will later use the CPA case
study to illustrate this point.

The Pragmatic Location of the Consensus Process

Taking a step back from the idealism of Graber and others cited here, I am not
elevating NGOs as a panacea to the world’s human rights problems. This ideal model of
consensus applies cleanly only to the ideal model of transnational NGO networking. I

7

To orient these two perspectives within the process of consensus, I’ve attached a flow chart of the
consensus process, which demonstrates how NGOs apply human rights standards(See appendix—I can’t
figure out how to make it fit into the body of the thesis as I would like).
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will now explore several downfalls of the theory presented above, and below I will posit
a role for anthropologists within the world of transnational human rights.
One of the largest difficulties in applying the consensus model to development or
human rights processes is that the NGO community is not comprised only of individuals
with singular motives: NGOs do not participate in a consensus process as individual
actors, but as complex organizations. Consequently, there exists within NGOs a
multifaceted system of micro-politics that determines the organizations’ goals and
principles. While an NGO’s principles are often clearly delineated in a statement of
mission, the realization of these principles depends on the organization’s staff. Many
other factors also play roles in determining the actions of NGOs, including institutional
and individual donors, and host states. NGO programs often extend into in the global
arena, beyond the control of the state, but the individuals and the physical framework that
enact these programs exist within the reach of state authority. States influence these
organizations by exerting power over their territory and individuals within them.
However, anthropologists who have explored state-NGO relationships have
warned against any conclusion regarding relationships between these two actors. Fisher
writes that one can not generalize the state attitude toward NGOs as solely antagonistic.
States, as well as local governments, are influenced by too many different factors to
predict how they will react to NGO activism within their territory, if they even care about
it at all (Fisher 1997). Likewise, assumptions about the role of NGOs, and the principles
that drive them present similar dangers because of the diversity of workers, donors, and
ideologies involved in the process. Based on these two observations, Fisher concludes:
“The relationships between NGOs and government are so heterogeneous that it is
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difficult to generalize about the potential impact of NGOs on the state and patterns of
governance” (1997). Fisher’s writing does not address the consensus process among
NGOs, but his theory does not preclude the possibility that the consensus process could
be co-opted by the state under such conditions.
Additionally, while Keck and Sikkink, Silvey, and others refer to NGO networks
as organizations that exist within transient flows rather than confined physical spaces,
one must remember that NGO action must occur in tangible spaces. In describing the
student anti-sweatshop movement, Silvey acknowledges that labor rights campaigns
affect workers in Third World countries with political histories that influence the efficacy
of seemingly placeless advocacy campaigns:

Rather than assuming that activist networks operate harmoniously in abstract
space…members of oppositional alliances are still based in places, and that
historically sedimented power relations still influence the dynamics of decisionmaking within networks. Hierarchies that exist between places condition the
operation of cross-place networks and the relative power of particular entities
working within and through such networks (2004).

Considering the imperialist history between the United States and the Philippines, and
ongoing neo-imperialist relationship, a power dynamic has been established between the
CPA and Bank even before they first began to interact. Furthermore, the grounding of
networks in places charged by political conflicts and power inequalities can negatively
influence, or even co-opt, the consensus process. These factors can threaten the
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efficiencies of horizontal network model, in comparison to the efficiencies of markets or
hierarchical organization, which already consider such relationships.
These faults do not completely discredit the application of the consensus model to
how NGO advocacy networks determine human rights standards. Certainly, the obstacles
described above prevent NGO advocacy networks from functioning with perfect
efficiency, and any brief analysis of the status quo reveals that global human rights
protections are not adequately enforced. But that human rights standards have evolved
since the Second World War demonstrates the growing acceptance of human rights as a
philosophy, as well as the networks that support it. Within the evolving field of human
rights, an important role for anthropologists is emerging.

Defining NGOs

No clear definition of a non-governmental organization exists. Almost all authors
cited here have presented their own definitions of the NGO, based on a wide variety of
criteria. Gerald Clarke, who writes extensively on NGOs in the Philippines, has created a
taxonomic system for organizing the diverse NGO world, based on structure, size,
function, membership, and other characteristics (1998). Clarke writes that nineteenth
century civic organizations served as the precursors to the contemporary NGO. Clarke
cites Alexis de Tocqueville and other nineteenth century authors as the first sources to
describe the right of civil association within the nation-state context. Clarke further
supports his claim by noting that the Young Men’s Christian Associations, founded 1855,
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and International Committee of the Red Cross, founded 1863, were civil associations that
evolved into the world’s first modern NGOs. Clarke defines NGOs as “private, nonprofit, professional organizations with a distinctive legal character, concerned with public
welfare goals” (1998). Clarke lays out further distinctions between NGOs and people’s
organizations, welfare organizations, and other non-governmental organizations that do
not meet his criteria to qualify as true NGOs. Under Clarke’s classification, the CPA is
an NGO that represents over 120 “people’s organizations.”
Clarke’s extensive categorization may be useful in a detailed exploration of
isolated functions of civil society, but his sub-divisions within the NGO community
unnecessarily complicate, rather than clarify, the process of determining the role of
NGOs in human rights processes. But Clarke’s exploration of the NGO world is useful in
that it highlights several key aspects and functions of NGOs.
Because the UN, a multilateral, intergovernmental organization, plays such an
important role in establishing international human rights standards, the relationship
between the UN and the NGO community sheds light on the functions of human rights
NGOs. Within this relationship, perhaps the most important element is that NGOs are in
fact non-governmental. “The negative language of the UN Charter, which simply defines
NGOs as not governmental organizations, gives little guidance to the question of what
constitutes an NGO. But it does reveal the defensive position of states towards NGOs
and their insistence that the status of an NGO is peripheral to that of a state” (Otto 1996).
Here Otto acknowledges that classifying what constitutes an NGO is anything but simple,
and she deviates from Clarke’s perspective by suggesting that further classification of
such organizations may be counter-productive. “At a minimum, the elusiveness of a
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satisfactory definition should encourage flexibility and open-endedness… This would
prioritize definitional concepts that ensure a diversity of view points, legitimate a
heterogeneity of NGO forms, and encourage an open and dynamic exchange of ideas and
experience” (Otto 1996). This thesis recognizes Otto’s understanding of the importance
of the state’s defensive relationship toward NGOs, and the utility of flexibility in defining
the NGO community. Also, Otto’s attention to the diversty of the NGO world conforms
with Fisher’s respect for the diversity of NGO-state relationships.
The relationship between the United Nations and NGOs helps illuminate the
complicated position of multilateral, interstate organizations such as the UN, World
Trade Organization, World Bank, and other development institutions. Multilateral
organizations, such as the World Bank (explored in detail later), are contractually bound
to their member states. Yet several of these organizations, including the UN and the
World Bank, have recognized that partnering with NGOs can them help accomplish their
missions more effectively. Since 2000, the Bank has greatly increased its cooperation
with NGOs, and have provided them with billions of dollars in grants (World Bank
2006). The number of collaborative projects has increased every year since 1990 (World
Bank 2006). The Bank has acknowledged that partnering with NGOs can make its
member-driven projects more effective, but more significantly, Bank officials have
acknowledged in interviews that NGOs can be used to circumvent the authority and
function of member states altogether.
Equally important to the structure of NGOs and their relationship to the state is
their function. Neo-liberal theory defines NGOs as a public sector service industry
(Silvey 2004), noting that the NGO sector is filling roles abandoned by the receding state.
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Several lines of evidence support a neo-liberal view of the role of NGOs: many NGOs
receive substantial funding from government agencies, both domestically and
internationally. NGOs also receive significant tax breaks in many countries, further
increasing their dependence on government support. Government regulations cover
political activity, budget policy, and employee compensation, and NGOs consistently
struggle to avoid violating NGO tax regulations. Governments often have power to
regulate and modify tax policy and monetary disbursements towards NGOs, and these
powers can be manipulated for political reasons. The White House Office of Faith-Based
and Community Initiatives, founded under President George W. Bush, funnels federal
monies to NGOs because of the view that they can better serve selected constituencies.
In 2005, more than $2.1 Billion were given to faith-based NGOs under the auspices of
this program (GAO 2006). This program serves as an example of the government’s
ability to shift the ideological orientation of the NGO community through its political,
legal, and economic power.
Neo-liberal discourse supports the image of NGOs as public service contractors as
well. This discourse assumes the supremacy and efficiency of the market above all else.
Within such a framework, NGOs must be seen as public sector contractors, because neoliberal discourse disregards other models for NGO work (ex. Mauss’ gift economy).
Bourdieu asserts that neo-liberalism is a discourse “not like others… [I]t is… so strong
and so hard to fight because it has behind it all the powers of a world of power relations
which helps make it as it is” (Cited in Silvey 2004).
Yet Silvey and others challenge this interpretation of the NGO world. In her
analysis of university-based anti-sweatshop NGOs, Silvey points out that anti-sweatshop
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groups challenge the discourse of neo-liberalism by bonding with workers abroad, which
is a refusal of the logic of globalized capitalist production. Hilhorst also challenges the
role of NGOs as a service sector within the neo-liberal model (2003). She does
acknowledge that NGOs provide services that receding states no longer deliver, and that
NGOs form the civil society that supports liberal democracy within the neo-liberal model
(Hilhorst 2003). Yet World Bank publications and interview data demonstrate the
diverse and unstable relationship between the state and NGOs in providing social
services. Perhaps the rigidity of the neo-liberal model provides too narrow a lens to
approach NGO work. To refute the association of the NGO sector with neo-liberal
development, Hihorst writes:

By claiming that they are the outcome of a hegemonic development discourse, it
is implied that NGOs operate according to a single discursive framework. This
leaves no room to take into account that development organizations may be
inspired by alternative ideological or religious frameworks, let alone that their
practices reveal how these different frameworks intertwine. Local actors are not
merely overcome by development: they interpret, bend and negotiate it (2003).

If one accepts the flexible and open-ended definition of NGOs as groups positioned in
opposition to the state, as presented above by Otto and others, then one must also
conclude that some NGOs refuse the discourse forwarded by the neo-liberal state. Too
much diversity exists within the NGO sector to suggest that NGOs serve only one
purpose, or respond to only one ideological constituency.
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In addition to attempts to define NGOs as a public sector service industry, others
have worked to define the NGOs, and particularly the human rights sub-sector, as a sector
whose purpose is to lobby states (Korey 1998). This point of view toward NGOs
dominates political science and international relations literature. Korey notes that NGOs
serve a variety of functions in the human rights arena: they lobby governments, monitor
rights violators, set standards, and raise awareness. But he writes that NGOs target states
in all these advocacy and informational activities. Korey dismisses NGO engagement of
the public as only a tactic to exert influence on the state. He provides an overview of
human rights NGO activity in the United States from the Second World War to the
present, describing the effectiveness of domestic and international NGOs in persuading
Congress to ratify UN human rights conventions.
The perspective of human rights NGOs as bodies that serve to lobby governments
applies in many senses, and many NGOs serve only that purpose. However, Korey’s
perspective ignores the diversity of actors in the international human rights arena.
Several prominent NGO campaigns have worked to change the behavior of multinational corporations by generating public outcry rather than through government
regulation. Without relying upon state power to establish human rights standards, the
international Nestle boycott in 1988 achieved significant voluntary concessions about
Nestle’s marketing of its infant formula (IBFAN 2006). Other NGO groups have pursued
an assortment of strategies to change corporate behavior, such as shareholder activism
and direct intervention (i.e. Greenpeace physically hindering whaling operations). As
this thesis will discuss below, non-state actors can often be much more effective in
precipitating changes in corporate or government behavior than legally-based policies
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implemented by states, who often have much invested in the corporations they are
charged to regulate. Given the diversity of human rights NGO tactics, NGOs must be
recognized as actors in their own right, rather than as organizations that function in the
shadow of the state.
Sally Engle Merry addresses the function of NGOs as organizations that translate
international human rights law from the global level into local contexts, utilizing the
hegemonic power of global institutions to do so. She considers the location of the NGO
within global power structures, an aspect that must be included in any anthropological
study of NGOs. Merry acknowledges that contemporary global forces are increasing
inequalities in wealth and power, and NGOs, human rights NGOs not excluded, play a
role within this system. If Western human rights NGOs work to implement international
law, then “Is human rights law simply a strategic weapon used by powerful groups to
legitimate their power grabs—a window dressing for real politik? Is it a form of
neoimperialism by which the West claims to save the benighted, savage peoples of the
rest of the world while actually pursuing its own interests” (Merry 2006).
Considering Merry’s critique, one can not analyze NGOs in isolation, outside
overlapping global, national, and local power structures. If an organization’s function
plays an important role in defining it as an NGO, then Merry’s understanding challenges
Clarke’s definition of an NGO as organizations “concerned with public welfare goals.”
As Merry and other authors assert (Hulme and Edwards 1997, Otto 1996), there is no
doubt that human rights NGOs occupy an intermediary position between international
law and local communities, and that they play a key role in the implementation of
international standards. The question becomes: who does the NGO serve? Do
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transnational human rights NGOs serve only the societies that fund them, or are they
truly altruistic enough and serve the communities subjugated by world power orders?
Both of these statements may be true. Clearly some NGOs function as a service
sector to neo-liberal government policies, as demonstrated above by financial
disbursements of the White House Office of Faith-Based and Communities Initiatives.
But as Hilhorst and others contend, a large diversity exists within the NGO community,
and the among the individuals who comprises these organizations. Also acknowledging
the validity of Otto’s positioning of NGOs as organizations in opposition to the state, one
must conclude that NGOs span a wide spectrum in regard to their function as pawns of
neo-liberal capitalism: some NGOs work to reinforce current power inequalities, while
others actively subvert them.
I have devoted much of this section to expanding the definition and orientation of
NGOs to be used in this thesis. Such a broad definition is necessary to capture the
diversity of functions and structures that transnational human rights NGOs represent. But
returning to Clarke’s definition of NGOs as “private, non-profit, professional
organizations with a distinctive legal character, concerned with public welfare goals”
(Clarke 1998), there are some organizations that do not fall within my broad definition of
the NGO. This thesis does not include terrorist or criminal organizations, armed groups,
or any other inherently violent organization in its spectrum. While this standard is by no
means perfect or clear, a meaningful definition of NGO can not be fully inclusive.
Within the Philippine context, the New People’s Army (NPA), Muslim National
Liberation Front (MNLF), and other armed separatist groups are excluded from this
analysis of the NGO community.
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The State

William Fisher writes that increasing globalization has precipitated significant
changes in the current global power structures, and a key element of this process is “the
sense that nation-states are no longer obvious and legitimate sources of authority over
civil society” (Fisher 1997). The withdrawal of the state from the regulation of
international activities, or perhaps its inability to fully regulate the increasingly large
NGO sector, continues to redefine the sectors in which the state participates, allowing for
the reclamation of space by non-state actors. Receding neo-liberal and former-socialist
states have left a wide variety of activities for NGOs to occupy, including environmental
regulation, community development, and increasingly, the establishment of human rights
standards.
Other scholars point out that population changes, including increased
transnational mobility, are widening the gap between the nation and the state (Otto 1996).
Otto further argues that increasing mobility challenges the nation as a structure itself:
“They are asserting that the multidimensional identities of the world’s peoples are not
adequately represented by the unidimensional idea of nationality” (Otto 1996). Otto’s
perspective helps reveal a key divide in the concept of the nation-state: the nation refers
to an emotionally attached group of people, while the state refers to governmental
institutions that exercise a monopoly of power within a given territory. The nation and
the state rarely overlap perfectly, creating struggle between the national identity and state
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bureaucracy. Globalization and the emergence of NGOs as a transnational force that
people increasingly identify with exacerbates this contradiction.
Hulme and Edwards also identify the withdrawal of the state as the current trend
in NGO-state relations (1997). With few exceptions, and as a result of Bank and other
neo-liberal policy, NGOs around the world are filling social roles once played directly by
the state. Many interpretations of this trend exist. Does the recession of the state imply
that NGOs, and specifically citizens associations, are gaining in power, or are
corporations and state-controlled NGOs serving as state surrogates, following the neoliberal model (Hulme and Edwards 1997)?
David Sadler examines anti-corporate activist movements, and his analysis
provides much information on transnational NGOs in general. One particularly important
point is that Sadler sees NGO attempts to regulate corporate human rights behavior as
struggles that occur in the international arena. That NGOs target behaviors that take
place in unregulated, and sometimes virtual (i.e. online) territory outside of state power
places states on the periphery of these struggles. To say that the role of the state is
diminishing misses Sadler’s point: if one fully accepts Sadler’s model of transnational
corporate campaigning, the state is largely irrelevant.
Following Sadler’s analysis, the NGO does not work against the state, but
opposes the power of MNCs, making influence over the state just one field of struggle.
This extension of Sadler’s argument conflicts with Otto’s definition of an NGO as an
organization in constant conflict with the state. But Sadler’s argument can not be
extended in all cases: while some states are powerless to regulate MNCs within their
borders, others exercise immense power over MNCs that operate within their territories.
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And even if NGO actions occur in a virtual, intangible field, the people who carry them
out remain physically vulnerable to state power. Furthermore, Sadler underestimates the
power of nationalism and patriotism mentioned above, and the influence of supra-statal
bodies such as the UN and the Bank, which prevents MNCs from fully co-opting even the
weakest of governments.
Graeber somewhat resolves the conflict between Otto and Sadler by presenting
the dual character of the state (Graeber 2004), which acknowledges the validity of both
perspectives. As mentioned earlier, he notes that states are utopian projects, deserving of
the nationalist sentiments they inspire, while at the same time they are “forms of
institutionalized raiding and extorsion” that contradict nationalism’s utopian aspirations
(2004: 65). Graeber’s position on the state certainly conflicts with that of several authors
presented in this thesis, because Graeber sees the state as an unnecessary structure. This
juncture does not invalidate Greaber’s claim of duality, however. Contemporary
anthropological literature acknowledges the split between the state and the nation, and
between the ideal and actual role of governments. If anything, it is not Graeber who is at
fault, but other authors who fail to recognize the complexity of “government” within the
term non-governmental organization.
Authors presented here also make other assumptions that undermine their theories
of state-NGO relations. Hulme and Edwards write that NGOs are filling roles once
occupied by the state, but this statement assumes that NGOs function independently of
the state. Often NGOs receive government funding, and instead of only occupying roles
vacated by the state, they can also be used to occupy new roles and expand state power.
World Bank funding of NGOs presents a second tactic used by states to influence NGO
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actions. Additionally, the expansion of NGO-driven faith based prison rehabilitation
programs in the United States provides a current example of government cooption
(Lehren 2006). The federal government has contracted with NGOs to provide faith-based
drug rehabilitation programs in prisons. Without using NGOs as an intermediary, such a
program would be unconstitutional, and therefore outside the explicit power of the state.
This example underscores the point that the growing presence of the NGO sector does not
mean the state is receding in all cases. NGOs remain dependent on external sources for
funding, and as cited above, many NGOs receive government funding. On the Global
level, the Bank has effectively funneled over $4 billion in government funding to NGOs
during the past 15 years (World Bank 2006). Furthermore, NGOs, even if they act in
transnational spaces, are subject to the laws of the host state. The NGO exists in physical
space, and NGO employees can be held accountable for the organization’s actions
abroad.
And while several authors have suggested, with much validity, that new the
mobility of people, information, and culture is challenging the state’s ability to maintain
its legitimacy through nationalism, other authors have argued that constructions of
nationalism adapt to accommodate changing populations and cultures. Evidence
indicates that racism, ethnicity, and other characteristics utilized to define communities
constantly evolve. For example, Paul Gilroy describes New Racism: “New racism is
concerned with inclusion and exclusion – on the one hand specifying who may
legitimately belong to a national community while simultaneously advancing reasons for
the segregation or banishment of those whose ‘origin, sentiment or citizenship’ assigns
them elsewhere” (Qtd. in Robbins 2004). Such an open definition of racism can draw
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upon an infinite number of signifiers to establish identity and to exclusion. Given the
evolving character of state identity, the non-governmental sector is constantly being
redefined.
Considering this, one must recognize that the state has many tools at its disposal
to respond to the identity crisis precipitated by mobility and globalization. NGOs have
many advantages over states in constructing flexible transnational identities and
horizontal communication, but states and the nationalisms outside of which NGOs
construct themselves are not static entities as some authors assume. Furthermore, since
the birth of the modern state, few states, if any, were ever truly homogenous, meaning
that transnational identities, while accelerated by globalization, and not a completely new
phenomenon for states to contend with.

Conclusion to the Review of Literature

In concluding the review of literature, I will summarize each of the contrasting
pairs discussed in the previous section. These summaries will serve as angles of inquiry
into an analysis of CPA and World Bank actions, policies, and discourse. After
investigating each organization individually, I will use the contrasting pairs to explore
how the two organizations interact, which is often in opposition to each other.
The policy/consensus pair draws significantly from Graeber’s writing on the
consensus process. Politically speaking, Graeber’s writing and politics come from a
fringe perspective. But significant evidence, which is currently being enacted in the
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NGO world, confirms the validity of this model. As discussed above, Keck and Sikkink,
Silvey, Sadler, and Sullivan all provide evidence for the effectiveness of the consensus
process within NGO and human rights networks. In the following chapters, I will discuss
the role of each organization within a human rights process that incorporates both actions
and standards precipitated by the coexistence of both policy and consensus systems.
The contrast within the state/NGO pair is theoretically more straightforward.
Following the working definition of the NGO that I have adopted, the NGO is oriented in
opposition to the state. However, the boundaries of the state constantly shift, and taking a
global perspective presents innumerable NGO/state relationships. Furthermore, despite
the above definition of NGO, these organizations do not always function in opposition to
the state, and often they will receive government funding or employ former government
personnel. Other complications exist in that many scholars, and some of the NGO
workers interviewed below, view NGOs as a public sector service industry that exists
solely to help states function more effectively. This view does hold true in some cases,
but it does not reflect the existing diversity among NGOs. The case studies presented in
the following chapters demonstrate contradictions between the stated role and actual
function of NGOs. As I reveal in the following chapters, this disconnect casts doubt on
the neo-liberal theory that NGOs function as a public sector service industry (from the
interviews with Freestone and Reynolds). While acknowledging the ambiguities,
considering the state and the NGO together allows for more effective analysis of the role
each plays in the realization of human rights standards . The role of the transnational
NGO is only fully revealed when the role of the state is considered in parallel. The above
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summary frames and provides focus to the following investigation of Bank and CPA
interactions in the Cordillera.
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Chapter IV: Conflict in the Cordillera

This chapter provides a history of the conflicts and interactions between
Cordillera Peoples Alliance (CPA) and the World Bank (the Bank) in the Philippines.
The United States government also greatly affects this relationship because it is a
significant political, economic, and military actor in the Philippines. The CPA is an
advocacy organization active in the Cordillera region of Luzon, and the Bank is one of
the world’s leading financial and development institutions. Supported economically and
politically by its member states, the Bank uses the hierarchical policy system to
implement its development model in middle and lower income countries around the
world. In the Cordillera, the CPA uses consensus-based advocacy methods to oppose
Bank infrastructure projects.
Beginning under the Marcos regime in 1980’s, the Bank became involved in
infrastructure, resources extraction, and other economic development projects in the
Cordillera. The CPA has been a primary opponent to these projects. Programmatically
and symbolically, these two organizations have struggled to control development policy
in the Cordillera region. The following chapter will pay particular attention to how these
histories have exasperated the state-CPA relationship in the Philippines.

A Brief History of the Cordillera
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The Cordillera is a geographically rugged region. The mountains are steep and
covered by jungle, divided by narrow river valleys. While modern, American-style
highways cover much of Luzon, the largest and most economically developed island of
the Philippines, the Cordillera remains largely outside of this transportation
infrastructure. Few roads provide access to the more remote villages in the Cordillera,
and existing roads become impassible during the long rainy season.
Much of the Philippines was brought under Spanish control in the mid-16th
Century. However, during their 333 years of colonization the Spanish never effectively
controlled the peoples of the Cordillera because of its geography and resistance to outside
rule. The Cordillera’s ethnic diversity and tribal organization contribute to this long
history or resistance. The region was first incorporated into wider Luzon under the
American colonization, which began in 1898. Disputes over the control of the Cordillera
continue to this day. The region is officially considered under the rule of the Manila
government, but few signs of government control are visible in more rural areas. The
New People’s Army, a Maoist rebel group, is active in the Cordillera, and claims to
provide services typically relegated to the state, including conflict resolution and
education. The government and activist groups such as the CPA dispute the level of NPA
activity in the Cordillera: government insists their influence is widespread, while activist
groups such as the CPA assert this serves only as a pretext for militarization of the region
(Corpuz 2007). Whatever the level of NPA activity, the point remains that the Cordillera
region has never been under the complete influence of the national government.
Following this history of largely hostile outside attempts to control the Cordillera,
the first serious efforts to develop the mountainous region occurred under the Marcos
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regime in the early 1970s. Increasing national industrialization increased national
demand for electricity, and the consolidation of political power under Marcos enabled the
centralized planning of large-scale projects. A Bank-financed feasibility study conducted
in 1973 scheduled construction of four dams on the Chico river to begin in 1978. These
plans were met with local resistance, and villagers forced surveyors out of the region
(Hilhorst 2003). The survey teams returned with military protection, and the military
units, as might be expected in under a military dictatorship in one of the world’s most
corrupt countries, began to intimidate the villagers. This is how the World Bank
introduced itself and its version of development to the residents of the Cordillera.
Within this history a unified Cordillera indigenous identity has emerged. Hilhorst
(2003) cites Finin’s description (1991) of the divided and often fighting Cordillera tribes.
Hilhorst writes that the Cordillera itself became defined as a region only under the
American colonization in the early 1900s. She suggests that American administrators
created this distinction to separate the residents of the region from the migrant laborers
used in the regions mines. The Americans created separate school systems for the
migrants, further distinguishing the Cordillera residents from the labors, who came from
other parts of Luzon. Under Marcos, the Chico River Dam again unified divided
populations within the Cordillera to oppose the project’s widespread environmental
impacts. Hilhorst writes that in addition to local indigenous groups, the anti-dam struggle
involved environmental and anti-Marcos activists from other parts of Luzon: “Moreover,
it was also clear that many people who formed part of the movement had no indigenous
identity at all. The movement attracted many followers, varying from national
politicians, a range of anti-dictatorship activists, an organization for national liberation, to
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international advocates. What these people shared was not an indigenous identity, but
rather a sense of identification with this movement” (2003: 32). Regardless, the CPA
asserts a claim to regional identity to advocate for Cordillera regional autonomy. For
example, the CPA continued to use the concept of cross-tribal regional indigenous
identification, or kaigorotan, to mobilize its supporters in the Cordillera. The CPA’s role
of serving as a regional indigenous group also helped it gain international prominence:
the CPA established many UN-related connections in 1993, the Year of Indigenous
People’s of the United Nations (Hilhorst 2003).
The policies of the Bank and other development institutions have certainly
improved since its first forays into the Cordillera. The Bank now has an indigenous
peoples policy: “Indigenous Peoples are a significant and important portion of humanity.
Their heritage, their ways of life, their stewardship of this planet, and their cosmological
insights are an invaluable treasure house for us all…” (World Bank 2007). But
widespread opposition to Bank projects and extractive industry continues in the
Cordillera; groups such as the CPA are the legacy of blundered attempts at economic
development and regional integration. Regardless of how well conceived current and
future development projects may be, current CPA publications show that Marcos’
shadow looms over any large-scale development projects.

The Philippine-US Alliance
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The close relationship between the Philippines and the United States has played
an important role in shaping the domestic political landscape in the Philippines.
Beginning with the United States’ occupation of the Philippines after the Spanish
American War, the Philippines and the United States have maintained a strong economic,
political, and military alliance. After World War II, the United States established major
Naval and Air Force bases on the island of Luzon, not far from the Cordillera region.
Additionally, over 3 million Americans of Filipino descent currently live in the United
States, with over 1 million in California (US Census Bureau 2005). This population
exerts significant influence on US policy towards the Philippines, and has elected
Filipino-Americans to Federal office. The two countries cooperate economically and
militarily, and the Philippines is listed as a “major non-NATO ally” of the United States
(Eckert 2007).
Several contradictions have arisen within this close relationship. The United
States has emerged as the Philippines’ strongest supporter in some instances, and as a
fierce critic in others. The AFP and the United States Military perform cooperative
missions against Muslim insurgents Mindinao and the Sulu Archipelago, and the
Philippines received over $220 million in military aid over the past three years (Eckert
2007). American corporations have also invested heavily in several sectors of the
Philippine economy, including agriculture and natural resources. The United States
influences the Philippine economy through its leverage within multilateral finance
institutions as well. The World Bank and Asian Development Bank have both invested
heavily in the Philippines. The United States is the largest investor in the Asian
Development Bank (ADB), holding 15% of its stock (Asian Development Bank 2007).
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From CPA’s perspective, such military and financial control represents the continuing
negative influence of their former colonial master through imperialist globalization. The
CPA describes agricultural liberalization and globalization as American imperialist
policies (CPA 2007 A). The CPA has further described these programs as “development
aggression” because they have resulted in internal migration and militarization.
However, the US and the World Bank feel very different economic effects of the
American-Philippine relationship, benefiting economically from the natural and labor
resources supplied by the Philippines.
Recently the relationship between the United States and the Philippines has also
suffered from a highly publicized rape case involving several American serviceman and a
Filipina. The incident took place in 2005 at Subic Bay, formerly the largest US Military
base overseas. In a move that has angered many Filipinos, the United States held the
suspects at the US embassy in Manila, rather than leaving them in the custody of the
Philippine justice system (Quismundo 2006). The incident has drawn attention to the
Visiting Forces Agreement, a mutual protection treaty between the two states that some
Filipinos view as a remnant of American colonialism. In a statement similar to those of
other left-leaning NGOs in the Philippines, the CPA writes:

The Philippines – US Visting Forces Agreement (VFA) is up for review. The
VFA provides for joint military ‘Balikatan exercises,’ which lay fertile conditions
for the exploitation and rape of Filipinas by US soldiers. The concrete case of
‘Nicole’ who was raped by Cpl. Daniel Smith in Subic is still a controversial
issues after the GMA [Gloria Macapagal Arroyo] government, under the cover of
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night, spirited away the convicted rapist to the safety of the US embassy (CPA
2007 A).

The Subic Bay rape case highlights the many tensions that have arisen from the US
military and corporate presence in the Philippines. The Subic rape case serves as a
metaphor for the environmental and social damage wrought by US militarism and
economic exploitation on the collective body of the Philippines. 8
Critics of the US-Philippine alliance, including the CPA, view the violence
committed by US troops, environmental damage caused by extractive industries, the
social harm of displacement caused by damming projects, and politically motivated
killings in the Cordillera region all as manifestations of American neo-imperialism. Yet
the United States has also criticized the Philippine government on its human rights
record. In research interviews conducted for this thesis, State Department officials have
highlighted US efforts to improve human rights in the Philippines. The State
Department’s “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices” for the Philippines has
harshly criticized behavior of the AFP and the Philippine National Police, accusing them
of a variety of human rights violations, including summary executions (US Department
of State 2006). This report has added to the credibility of allegations by the CPA and
other NGOs that the AFP is systematically violating human rights without repercussions
from the civilian government. State Department officials also stated that they are in

8

This is my own assertion, though it is informed by Hildson’s (1995) gendered analysis of the ongoing
AFP-NPA conflict. Hildson sees the AFP as masculine, and describes their use of sexual violence as a tool
of control. Considering the partnership between the AFP and US military forces, I do not believe my claim
is unfounded. Further supporting this assertion is the highly visible environmental damage wrought by the
US Military on the Philippines.
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contact with both the US embassy in Manila and the Philippine embassy in Washington,
D.C. regarding the deteriorating human rights situation.
This dual stance of criticism and partnership between the United States and the
Philippines creates a strange relationship between the CPA and the United States. On the
one hand, the CPA is highly critical of United States investment and military involvement
in the Philippines. American troops are currently stationed in the Philippines and conduct
joint anti-terror exercises with the AFP, a practice that progressive Filipinos view as an
remnant of American colonialism. However, State Department Human Rights Reports
are widely respected in the Philippines (State Department interview 2007). Joan Carling,
the CPA Chair Person, met with State Department officials to express her concerns about
human rights violations indirectly caused by these same policies. The United States is
both an evil imperialist and protector of human rights. In this case, the link between the
NGO and the state has become more complicated.
The State Department testified in favor of transferring the convicted rapist in the
Subic Bay case to US custody, a move that greatly angered the CPA (cite inquirer article
– saved in thesis folder). Additionally, a strong case can be made that United States
military aid to the AFP has increased the AFP’s political power, and therefore its ability
to commit human rights violations without fear of punishment from the civilian
government in Manila. During the course of this research, neither side, and none of my
interview subjects, has commented on this contradiction. No apparent conflict exists
within the stated missions of the involved organizations—the AFP provides security, the
Bank fosters development, the Department of State promotes US interest, the CPA
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protects indigenous rights—but on the ground a violent, and sometimes deadly conflict
continues.
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Chapter V: The Rise of the Cordillera Peoples Alliance

The CPA was founded in 1984, under the Marcos dictatorship. Rising from a
politically repressive climate, and noting a history of government and Bank collusion, the
CPA emerged as a group staunchly opposed to large-scale infrastructure projects within
the Cordillera region, citing their detrimental environmental and cultural impacts on the
region’s residents. In describing the organization’s founding, the website states: “The
founders of CPA were mainly indigenous leaders and activists who spearheaded the
widespread and successful opposition to the World Bank-funded Chico dams project and
the commercial logging operations…” (CPA 2007 C). The organization coordinates a
loose federation of indigenous, environmental, and leftist political organizations, all
which take hostile stances toward the central government and large-scale development
projects and extractive industries. Critics have continuously asserted that linkages exist
between the CPA and local communist groups (see Bryant 2005). However, this illicit
connection, if it exists at all, is greatly overshadowed by the organization’s ties with
legitimate leftist political parties.
Many of the authors I have cited in this thesis have constructed typologies of
NGOs, organizing them by any combination of a plethora of characteristics, including
structure, funding sources, mission, size, and regional scope (See Clarke 1998, Ferguson
1991, Hilhorst 2003, Hulme and Edwards 1997, Keck and Sikkink 1998). I do not
attempt to construct my own typology, nor do I utilize any the typologies of the scholars
listed here; each typology offers unique benefits and flaws. Instead, I consider several
characteristics of the CPA to help define what it is and does, in relation to its NGO peers.
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The CPA characterizes itself as an indigenous, human rights, and environmental
advocacy organization. Clarke (1998) characterizes the CPA as a membership
organization, meaning that rather than representing individual constituents, smaller
member organizations comprise its constituency. The CPA advocates only on issues
relevant to the Philippines and its member organizations, but it draws support from a
diverse body of international partners. The CPA receives much of its funding from
Western-based indigenous and environmental advocacy NGOs and from Western-based
private philanthropic foundations. As I discuss below, the CPA engages in a variety of
advocacy tactics, making it particularly difficult to classify the CPA by its actions. It
engages in street protests, but also involves technical consultants to lobby the Bank. The
CPA typically associates with leftist political parties, and its advocacy typically conflicts
with the Philippine government.
The CPA has emerged out of a tumultuous, unpredictable political climate. From
the beginning of the American occupation until the Marcos era, a quasi-oligarchy exerted
significant control over Philippine politics. During the 1980s, the decade of CPA’s
founding, the Philippines was under martial law (established my Marcos in 1972), under
the pretexts of anticommunism and national development. Scholars have compared
Marcos’s ambitions to those of Lee Kwan Yew of Singapore because of their stated goals
of economic development and willingness to sacrifice civil liberties in the process. But
they have also compared Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos to Lord and Lady Macbeth,
because of their whimsical and self-aggrandizing style of rule (Norton 2005). As Marcos
consolidated his power through expanding the domestic power of the military, over
which he exerted significant control, he replaced the oligarchic political system largely
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by shirting political and economic power to the military, giving immense power to
individual officers.
This reshuffling of political power generated great instability. Under Marcos’
strict restrictions on personal freedoms, political and military opponents, particularly the
Communist Party of the Philippines and the New People’s Army, grew in number. Legal
NGO opposition groups were also formed during this time, the most prominent being
Task Force Detainees, a faith-based group founded to aid political prisoners. The
perceived communist threat prompted a violent response from the army, which
committed numerous crimes, including intimidation and extralegal killings. Although
political control in the Philippines formally shifted back to civilian control in 1986, the
army remains bloated and politically powerful.

NGO-State Tensions: The Philippine Government and the CPA

The Philippines serves as a prime example of the characteristic tensions within
NGO-state relationships. Over the past twenty years NGOs have fermented movements
to overthrow two presidents, and almost toppled the current President, Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo. The constitution nominally affords many of the civil and political liberties found
in Western democracy, but a corrupt and uncontrollable police and military forces use
violence to severely limit these liberties. Consequently, an active NGO population
collides not with the gentler restraints of many Western democracies, but with the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, which has changed little since the Marcos era.
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The current president, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, has not effectively controlled
the Philippine army during her presidency. The army has received blame for hundreds of
extrajudicial killings, which have primarily targeted leftist political activists, including
the CPA. Filipino activists, international NGOs, the United Nations Human Rights
Council, and the United States Department of State all suggest, with varying degrees of
certainty, that elements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines are directly responsibly
for the killings. However, analysts and human rights advocates debate the President’s
role, and question whether she would have the power to stop the killings if she involved
herself in the situation. Over the past year, the killings have drawn increased
international attention, particularly from Protestant churches in the United States and
Europe because of the killings of Filipino church workers. Strong ties exist between
church groups and leftist organizations because of their mutual struggle against the
Marcos regime (Clarke 1998). Also, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch
both issued reports on the killings in 2006. 9 The large Filipino community in the US has
also been very vocal in its support for human rights improvements in the Philippines.
Groups like BAYAN USA (www.bayanusa.org) advocate a progressive, anti-Arroyo
position, and have worked to draw attention to the human rights abuses committed under
her presidency.
Since April 2000 CPA staff have been subjected to politically motivated
intimidation and other attacks, including the killings and assaults. I contend that these
attacks are a manifestation of CPA-World Bank violence. While no direct connection

9

As of March 2007, Amnesty International reports on the Philippines are located at
http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/philippines/index.do and HRW reports are located at
http://www.hrw.org/doc?t=asia&c=philip
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between the Bank and political killings in the Philippines exists, the CPA identifies the
Philippines government and the Armed Forces of the Philippines as agents of Bankperpetuated imperialism and neo-liberalism. Citing possible threats from leftist groups,
over the past few years the government has imposed restrictions on civil liberties for
security reasons, in legislation similar to the USA Patriot Act. CPA press releases draw
connections between the Bank and government because these restrictions have been used
to criminalize some anti-Bank protests (CPA 2007 B).
Considering the history of violence between leftist activists and the state security
forces surrounding Bank-funded projects in the Cordillera, CPA claims of Bank
responsibility for violence have some merit. Current rights abuses against groups such as
the CPA are not a recent development, but rather the most recent phase in a history of
state-sponsored, or at the very, least state-tolerated violence. After the fall of the Marcos
regime and the transition to a more democratic government, the human rights situation
within the Philippines greatly improved. However, the Ramos government continued to
tolerate human rights abuses against progressive groups and other deviant NGOs. By
some accounts, these abuses were more targeted and more brutal than the rights
violations experienced under Marcos (Amnesty International 1992, cited in Hilhorst
2003).
Equally important as the history of state-NGO relations is the CPA’s current
location within the Philippine political climate. Hilhorst writes that the Philippines has a
remarkably dense and diverse NGO population, even compared to Western democracies
(2003). Hilhorst cites several factors that have led to such a vibrant civil sector. She
notes that the turbulent political climate has led to the growth of political advocacy
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groups, and the government’s failure to address a myriad of social problems, including
prostitution and gender-based violence, have led to the growth of NGOs concerned with
these issues (2003). Additionally, both the Catholic and Protestant churches, which
together claim almost 90% of Filipinos as members (CIA 2007), actively participate in
local and national political debates. All of these factors have led to the high density of
NGOs in the Philippines.
Hilhorst writes that the best way to locate an NGO within its local political
environment is to consider its stakeholders (2003). To locate the CPA within the
Philippine NGO community, one must consider that the CPA represents more than 120
“community organizations,” and that these organizations span multiple Cordillera
provinces. Additionally, the CPA also represents “sectoral federations of youth, women,
elders, peasant, and cultural workers” (CPA 2007 C). Considering the convergence of
diverse organizations represented under the CPA name, the differing domestic views of
the CPA—from an indigenous advocacy organization, to an environmental organization,
to a progressive political group, to a communist front—are more understandable.
The CPA’s diversity, and its wide representation of marginalized groups, provides
a large target for political oppression. Considering the abusive history and political
power of the AFP and police in the Philippines, it is unsurprising that the CPA has
become a subjected to political pressure, which often takes the form of violence.
Philippine history has been characterized by corruption, oligarchic politics, and
militarism. CPA’s relationship with the government and security forces remind us these
forces continue to dominate power relations in the Philippines.
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In regard to development, since the 1970s the Cordillera has become a conflict
zone between different economic development strategies. Hilhorst describes the contrary
approaches to development held by the central government and the primarily indigenous
residents of the Cordillera (2003). Hilhorst writes that residents of the Cordillera have
sympathized with the New People’s Army, a national communist insurgency active in the
region, while the central government has pursued a Neoliberal economic plan:

In the 1970s, protests against the construction of hydrological dams in the area
spurred the growth of People’s Organizations and movements, and the
formulation of an indigenous discourse. At the same time, the region became a
stronghold for the revolutionary struggle of the National Democratic Front and its
armed wing, the New People’s Army, enjoying for years much support among
villagers. A high level of militarization by the government, including the
bombing of areas in the 1990s, accompanied by extensive propaganda against
development NGOs, further sharpened ongoing debates…Meanwhile, the
Philippine government increasingly pushed for the ‘development’ of the
Cordillera, which in practice mainly meant the exploitation of its natural and
cultural riches through dams, mines and tourism. This notion of development has
constantly been challenged by NGOs, which supported small-scale projects and
introduced concepts like participatory and sustainable development to the
communities. Hence, the concept of development has become highly contested
(Hilhorst 2003).
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Hilhorst convincingly explains why NGOs such as the CPA have consistently clashed
with development institutions such as the Bank. One could not conceive of a relationship
more antagonistic than that between neo-liberal economists and Maoist insurgents. The
CPA finds itself caught in the middle, and the organization and the individuals who
support it feel pressure from both sides. The history of United States imperialism in the
Philippines and the current close cooperation between the two governments helps shed
more light on the conflicts in the Cordillera.
The violence described above is but one manifestation of the tensions inherent in
the NGO-state relationship. As the state works to expand its power, other arenas become
involved in this conflict. The following section will describe struggles over Cordillera
identity central to the CPA-state relationship.

Development of the Cordillera as an Attack on Indigenous Identity

One result of damming projects that the Bank and CPA do not dispute is the
significant lifestyle changes they have caused for the populations directly affected by
them. The Bank measures change—development—in megawatts, miles of paved road,
and jobs created. These are all described as improvements over the status quo by the
Bank. The CPA depicts local change through “before” and “after” photos of dammed
regions. The “after” photos show flooded valleys and flattened mountaintops, but the
CPA also acknowledges that the dams will create wage jobs on newly irrigated
plantations and new concrete houses with electricity for those displaced by the flooding.
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Whether or not this would be an improvement for the mostly indigenous Cordillera
residents, the Philippine government has not presented this different lifestyle as an
option, but has forced it upon them. The Marcos government ignored the popular
resistance in the Cordillera to damming and mining projects, and the Aquino government
actually militarized the region (she sent 20,000 soldiers) more intensively than Marcos
had (Hilhorst 2003). Furthermore, the indigenous people’s policies of both of the
development banks active in the region, the ADB and the World Bank, do not require
prior informed consent of local populations, but only prior informed consultation. Even
then, this consultation policy was not implemented until the early 1990s, after many
development projects had already been undertaken in the Cordillera. According to Bank
officials, the consultation process is more of a courtesy than a meaningful dialogue
regarding Bank policy: “We haven’t historically done a very good job of consulting
people. We do consult people, but a lot of times we do it half-assed, or we do it very
short time frame or we do it very last minute, or we don’t follow through the on the
recommendations” (Reynolds Interview). After all, inherent to the Bank’s existence is
the assumption that it improves impoverished areas better than local governments. The
Bank sees its development model as “naturalized, legitimate, and durable” (Goldman
2005). Neo-liberalism dictates that the Bank’s development model, designed by
economists, can make better planning decisions for the Cordillera than the residents can
themselves.
The Bank’s failure to consult with the local populations has generated such a
hostile reaction from the Cordillera residents not only because of the economic and
environmental affects of infrastructure projects, but also because of the subtextual
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meaning of these actions. Racism against indigenous groups of the Cordillera and
militarization of the region combine to create a feeling that indigenous identity is under
attack. Similar to other situations of Bank-state partnership, both institutions are
considered by affected populations to be equal actors in these harmful policies, justifiably
or not.
One fairly simple line of evidence supporting this assertion is the projects’
displacement of people because of flooding caused by dams and environmental harm
caused by logging and mining operations. Indigenous peoples are forced from historic
mountain homes into lowland villages and cities. Such migration forces a change from
subsistence farming to participation in the cash economy, often through cultivating cash
crops or laboring on plantations, irrigated by water supplied by the reservoirs created by
new dams. While the Bank and government argue that economic necessity precipitates
such changes, the affected Cordillera peoples see it as an attack on their identity.
That Cordillera residents are subjected to violence also serves as an attack on their
identity as residents of the Cordillera Autonomous Region (rather than citizens of the
Philippines). 10 In creating a functional definition of violence, Keppley-Mahmood writes
that that violence is not only a physical attempt at social control, but is also used to
control religion, loyalty, culture, and most basically to define the identity of the subjects
of violence (Keppley-Mahmood 2002). For Nordstrom, violence is an attempt to control
the mind and body through “the destruction of home and humanity, of hope and future, of
valued traditions and the integrity of community” (Keppley-Mahmood 2002). Violence
in the Cordillera has assumed each of the forms described by Keppley-Mahmood and
10

Officially, the Cordillera is located in the Cordillera Administrative Region. Many residents support the
creation of a Cordillera Autonomous Region, but this proposal has met opposition from the Manila
government.
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Nordstrom: destruction of homes by damming projects, removal of tradition by forcing
populations from sustenance farming into wage labor, and destruction of community by
forcing whole villages to relocate. The heavy militarization of the region has also led to
more physical forms of violence.
CPA actions and publications have also suggested that many view the struggle
over the Cordillera’s development as a struggle over indigenous identity. CPA
publications have described the successful halting of the Chico river damming project as
a triumph of indigenous technology over the Philippine state. CPA documents describe
not only the indigenous victory over armed opponents but the assertion of the indigenous
self in the face marginalization in wider Philippine and global society. These
publications portray a story of resistance through the establishment of self-respect:

The Kalinga and Bontok tribes people managed to stop the construction of the
four huge hydroelectric dams which were a priority energy project of the Marcos
government through the long years of martial rule. They were able to stop
construction against fearsome odds by asserting their tribal people’s power. In
their steadfast and uncompromising defense of their ancestral lands and their
indigenous way of life, they earned the respect and support not only of the other
national minorities in the region, but also the progressive and democratic forces
both here in the Philippines and abroad (CPA 2007 D).

Considering the discrimination faced by indigenous peoples worldwide, radical resistance
to damming projects is not just part of a battle for local control, but a call for recognition
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in a neo-liberal world where indigenous identity is systematically marginalized and
devalued. In light of the underlying meanings of development products felt by the
peoples of the Cordillera, it is unsurprising that they hold neo-liberalism and
globalization responsible for the attacks on their identity, rather than blaming failures on
poor implementation of sound development policy on local political failures such as
corruption, as Bank officials do.
The question of who blames whom offers significant insight into the state-NGO
relationship. That the Bank, as a hierarchically dominant, intergovernmental
organization, blames the poor functioning of the global statist system, while the CPA
blames “globalization” reveals how NGO-state tensions affect each organization. The
CPA and its constituency have suffered at the hands of policy implemented by the
partnership between the Philippine government and the Bank. The Bank’s credibility has
suffered from the opposition of advocacy groups such as the CPA, but the Bank remains
one of the world’s dominant institutions. The following section will discuss some of the
bureaucratic complexities of the Bank-CPA relationship, and how poor communication
within these bureaucracies leads to conflict.

The Philippines, the Bank, and the CPA: A Curious Relationship

One possible explanation for the disconnect appears within the bureaucratic
structures of the institutions involved. While discussing the indigenous rights obligations
of Bank members under international law, Carolyn Reynolds pointed out that although
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these groups may have committed to a “prior informed consent” in the UN context, a
variety of factors have prevented this commitment from applying in practice. Reynolds
notes that government, Bank, and UN bureaucracies are comprised of individuals with
personal agendas that do not always conform to the organizations’ missions. One
government agency pursue its own agenda while another, knowingly or unknowingly,
works to contradict it. When I mentioned the ongoing debate within the Bank and the
wider development industry about “prior informed consent” (in contrast to “prior
informed consultation”) from communities affected by development projects, Reynolds
responded:

So they [Bank members] will never accept that [prior informed consent] language
[within the Bank context], even though they many have accepted that language in
the UN Context. But in the Bank’s context because there’s money involved… I
mean as a principle it’s easy to say that [a country is committed to prior informed
consent], but when it comes to whether this is going to affect money, people…
countries make different decisions… See that’s another problem that you have
with these global organizations… And the same governments sit on the boards of
these organizations but they send different representatives so the people who sit at
the UN representing Botswana or India are from the foreign affairs ministry, the
people who sit on the board of the Bank or the IMF are from the ministry of
finance or planning and they don’t see the world in the same way… In their own
countries they have different roles to play (Reynolds 2007).
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Several CPA publications have called for the implementation of prior informed consent
standards, which many indigenous rights NGOs advocate for. The gap between rhetoric
calling for prior informed consent policies from bodies such as the UN and the failure of
international finance organizations to implement them has not gone unnoticed by CPA.
In a letter to the ADB, the CPA and partner organizations, including the International
Rivers Network, urged the ADB to adopt a standard of prior informed consent, following
the recommendations of the UN and transnational NGOs (CPA 2004). This action by the
CPA and its partners represents an attempt to use the consensus process to shift Bank
policy. The UN and ADB represent many of the same governments, yet they have
constructed different policies for development projects. Organizations such as the CPA,
and their constituent member organizations, are caught within the bureaucratic disconnect
of government agencies. Better horizontal integration among governments and
multilateral organizations might have lessened the intensity of the Bank-CPA conflict.
Reynolds’ wording also highlights a difficulty with modeling the behavior of
NGOs and other transnational organizations. While ideally an organization makes
decisions so that it may effectively achieve its mission, in reality organizations can not
make decisions; people make decisions. So Reynolds’ self-correction of her comment is
indicative of the difficulties of her position as a Bank employee: “when it comes to
whether this is going to affect money, people… countries [emphasis added] make
different decisions…” (2007). As she later elaborates, countries do not actually make
decisions, individuals working within distinct agencies carry out the functions of
government bureaucracy. Violence, such as the political killings described above, protest

Robbins 68
at meetings of international finance organizations, and destructive development policies,
results from this disconnect.
In applying Reynolds’ example to the Philippines—where the death of political
activists at the hands of Filipino soldiers trained by American forces is condemned by the
American Embassy in Manila—no ideological conflict exists between the State
Department and the CPA. Yet current American policy exacerbates NGO-state tensions
by creating a bureaucratic gap between two arms of the American government attempting
to implement a supposedly uniform foreign policy.
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Chapter VI: The World Bank

Because of its size and complexity, I will not attempt to provide a detailed history
of the Bank and its mission. Much of the Bank’s history and programs are not directly
relevant to this research. But the Bank has played an influential role in the Cordillera
region of the Philippines. Because of close ties between the United States and the anticommunist Marcos regime, the Bank and other international finance organizations
became especially active in the Philippines. The Bank is also a dominant force in
creating global neo-liberal discourse, which has permeated Philippine government
programs. Perhaps the largest effect of the Bank in the Philippines has not been its
infrastructure programs but its influence on government policy towards the development
of extractive industries and damming projects. 11 Considering the importance of these
industries in the Cordillera region, and CPA’s opposition to them, the Bank does conflict
very directly with the CPA.
The Bank uses the publications of its Civil Society Team to construct its
discursive relationship with civil society organizations, and to keep NGOs and bank
members aware of its evolving NGO policy. Several issues relevant to transnational
NGOs are debated within this literature. 12 “Issues and Options for Improving
Engagement Between the World Bank and Civil Society Organizations,” a Bank report
published in 2005, discusses many of the problems that have arisen from the Bank’s trend
of increasing civil society organization (CSO) participation in its projects. Bank projects
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For example, the Mining Act of 1995 greatly reduced restrictions on investment in mining projects by
foreign corporations.
12
The World Bank Uses the term CSO throughout its literature. Refer to the Appendix for a comparison of
the two terms.
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have revealed tensions inherent within state-NGO relationships, and support the Bank’s
method of development implementation: top-down policy. The report also discusses, in
general terms, the ongoing relationship between the Bank and CSOs, which can be
applied to Bank-CPA conflict in the Philippines. More often than not, this conflict occurs
discursively, as the following examples illustrate.
The report immediately addresses the question of the Bank’s decision to engage
CSOs at all: according to its 1945 Articles of Agreement, the Bank’s members and
supporting clients are states, and no formal role for NGOs was established. The Bank
only began to significantly engage CSOs in the 1990s (World Bank 2005). Interviewees
at the Bank have presented varying perspectives on whether its engagement of CSOs
displeased its member states because of the shift of economic and political support away
from state governments. The Bank’s official position, as presented in Bank publications,
remains that CSO engagement, by aiding the implementation of development policy, has
bolstered the power of its member states.
But in spite of this position, the Bank has found it necessary to address this
possible conflict of interest between funding states and non-governmental organizations
that, by definition, function in opposition to them. 13 The Bank, acknowledging its
position as an inter-governmental organization, caught between its state clients and CSO
partners, portrays its delicate position in positive language:

As the influence of CSOs continues to grow, they are also attracting greater public
scrutiny, prompting calls for greater accountability. Some government

13

Twice, once at the very beginning of this report in the second paragraph of the Executive Summary, and
again in the Introduction.
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authorities, notably parliamentarians in developing countries, have begun to
question who CSOs represent and how much weight should be given to their
views vis-à-vis the views of elected officials and other stakeholders (p. X).

The above statement demonstrates government resentment toward the engagement of
CSOs in Bank projects. One must assume that the call for “greater accountability”
implies CSO accountability to the governments of the states in which they operate, which
is, in effect, a call for greater government control over CSOs. Additionally, that
governments in developing countries are calling for further control of CSOs is not
surprising, considering that their typically weaker states are more likely to feel threatened
by the expanding role of the non-governmental sector.
The Bank also portrays itself as a scapegoat within CSO-government disputes, as
an innocent entity caught in the middle of preexisting conflicts. Bank policy, directed by
its Articles of Association, requires that it does not involve itself in domestic political
issues. Yet funding large-scale infrastructure projects often has political ramifications.
“Even when the responsibility for the decision or process in question rests with an
individual government, CSOs often believe that targeting the Bank, with its political and
financial clout and international media scrutiny, is more likely to get attention and force
change than targeting the government involved” (World Bank 2005). The Bank might
view its position as non-political because it provides funding and technical advice for
projects, and it is formally subordinate to the host state. Yet the effects of its projects,
such as the damming projects in the Cordillera, affect thousands of people, drawing both
legal and extralegal reactions.
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Stakeholders negatively affected by Bank projects, or the CSOs that support them,
do not always care to distinguish the Bank’s role from that of its governmental partners.
The Bank drew much criticism in the Cordillera for funding dam projects under the
Marcos regime. Indeed, the struggle between CSOs and the Philippines government over
the Chico River Dam demonstrated that the Bank can prove to be more responsive than
the client state in which it operates, especially when it partners with an authoritarian
government, or a government of questionable legitimacy, like the Marcos regime. The
Bank retains a negative image throughout the Cordillera because of its partnership with
the Marcos regime, despite its self-assessment that it has become more responsive to
local concerns raised by CSOs. The CPA website repeatedly mentions that the Bank
once cooperated with the Marcos government, even though he was deposed over twenty
years ago.
Yet considering the extensive control that institutions such as the Bank exert over
indebted states such as the Philippines, some of civil society’s criticisms of international
finance organizations are legitimate. The Bank’s explicit mission focuses solely on
economic development, but since the founding of the Bretton Woods institutions, its
economic influence has expanded into many government programs only vaguely related
to government policy. 14 As James Ferguson writes: “It should be noted that direct
impositions of policy by banks and international agencies have involved not only such
broad macroeconomic interventions as setting currency-exchange rates, but also fairly
detailed requirements for curtailing social spending, restructuring state bureaucracies, and
so on” (2006). Ferguson continues that states often receive blame for the negative
consequences of policies they enact at the behest of international finance organizations,
14

Joseph Stiglitz provides a particularly detailed account in Globalization and Its Discontents
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regardless of their inability to ignore requests of multilateral organizations. States that
have successfully shunned Bank support and have continued to develop, such as
Botswana or China, are few and far between. So while angry citizenries often fail to hold
accountable the responsible institution in individual cases, both the state and the Bank are
often viewed as equally culpable partners, and receive blame for one another.
This conflict between the state, Bank, and CSOs can be approached from several
different angles. As I have described in the literature review, the term NGO, at its most
basic level, can be understood through its oppositional position to the state. One common
approach to state-CSO struggle constructs a vertical hierarchy, placing the state at the top
and CSOs below (Ferguson 2006). After presenting this model, Ferguson argues that it
oversimplifies state-CSO relationships. Fisher’s (1997) discussion of the great variety of
state-NGO relationships supports Ferguson’s perspective.
However, much evidence indicates that a vertical hierarchy between the Bank,
Philippine state, and CPA exists, and it would be ludicrous to assert that a tandem of the
state and international finance institutions is not located near the top. While some states
more effectively exert power over their territories than others, and some states can afford
to ignore the requests of international finance institutions, the state-Bank alliance remains
more powerful than civil society in all cases. The imposing World Bank headquarters in
Washington D.C., with its armed guards and extensive security measures, visibly
demonstrates the Bank’s position. The expansion of Washington Consensus-style
development policies by the Bank and its member states, often in the face of popular
opposition (as in the Cordillera) provide the most fundamental example within this
context. In fact, few places on earth exist where the Bank is not a dominant political
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power, and these states (Cuba, Iran, North Korea) are ostracized by the international
community.

Bank Discourse

Bank discourse provides evidence demonstrating the institution’s dominance over
civil society. This discourse supports the Bank’s use of policy implementation rather
than the consensus process as a development method. Policy is the current development
strategy of states, regional development banks, and other international financial
institutions. Bank discourse assumes policy as the desired status quo, and works more to
attack the consensus process than defend its policy methods. This section describes how
the Bank attacks the consensus networking process, used by student groups, NGOs, and
other allies (Keck and Sikkink 1997, Silvey 2004).
The Bank uses several metaphors that assert a dominant power relationship over
its NGO critics. In “Issues and Options for Improving Engagement Between the World
Bank and Civil Society Organizations,” the Bank describes a lack of growth and maturity
among World Social Forum (WSF) protestors: “Whether the WSF will mature enough to
become a space that influences the scope and pace of economic globalization remains to
be seen” (24). 15 The Bank also suggests that protesters oppose the Bank because of their
naiveté: “Students and youth in particular have been easily recruited to the anti-Bank
bandwagon, when they hear simplistic messages that Bank staff are responsible for
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The World Social Forum is an anti-globalization meeting created in response to the World Economic
Forum.
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decisions that actually rest with governments” (25). The Bank also acknowledges its
more powerful discursive position through its discussion of who understands the global
economic reality, and its opponents simplistic “perceptions.”
Bank publications repeatedly attempt to redefine the Bank-civil society
relationship. In describing street protests against international financial institutions, one
report states:

Protests that have occurred around World Trade Organization, Bank, IMF and
other international summit meetings in recent years have focused on a plethora of
issues, including denouncing the war in Iraq and other conflicts, and particularly
on the negative effects they perceive resulting from globalization… They accuse
the IMF, Bank, and WTO of being the agents of the rich governments and
multinational corporations, which they perceive as benefiting most from
globalization and trade liberalization. Some protestors believe there is an
inevitable conflict between the role of lending institutions and the goal of
reducing poverty (25).

Many protestors do indeed accuse the Bank of being agents of rich governments and
believe that an inevitable conflict exists between lending institutions such as the Bank
and reducing poverty. Others critics suggest that neo-liberal ideology plays a larger role
than development goals in shaping bank policy (the following section includes interview
data to support this assertion). That the Bank can refute these assertions simply by
denying them demonstrates its superior discursive position. In contrast, anti-Bank
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protesters and NGOs do not have comparable access to media, allowing the Bank to
describe its position in relation to these groups in contemporary global society.
Goldman helps outline the superior discursive position of the Bank by noting that
development is considered a necessity of modern human existence (2005). With few
exceptions, NGOs, such as the CPA, do not question the necessity of development, they
only dispute the best path towards economic development. Goldman continues that the
question “is economic development the appropriate path to follow” is never raised. The
only critique of economic development commonly accepted by academia, governments,
and the general public is whether countries are developing in a sustainable manner.
Following this discourse, development becomes the primary paradigm for understanding
interactions between the global North and South. By focusing on formalized financial
interactions (i.e. bilateral foreign aid, multinational western-based NGOs, Bank projects),
other global flows of people and ideas, as well as significant informal economies, are
ignored.
The Bank also determines the grounds on which it engages NGOs, which also
points to its more powerful position in relation to civil society. Currently there are no
formal guidelines for Bank-CSO engagement. Rather, the Bank determines with whom it
works on an ad hoc basis.
The use of the terms policy and consensus further play into the top-bottom
hierarchy locating the Bank-state tandem and civil society. Policy, as discussed
previously, refers to rules established by a bureaucracy to govern those under its control
because the bureaucracy believes it has greater ability to govern its subjects than they
themselves (roughly, Graeber 2004). While the Bank does not describe its actions in
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such a cynical tone, it nonetheless contrasts its “policy” with the consensus process. In
one example, the Bank describes its efforts to more fully engage CSOs:

With these more militant groups, there is little basis for the Bank to expect that
constructive relations are possible or desirable. However, the evolution of the
World Social Forum (WSF) and other civil society forums suggest that even some
of the more radical social movements may be maturing, recognizing the need to
move beyond using protest as an advocacy tool and engaging policy makers in
serious debate about policy alternatives”(World Bank 2005).

“Policy alternatives” implies modifying Bank policy, rather than adopting different
approaches to economic development, such as processes based on consensus or
indigenous technologies. Again, the condescending tone indicates a superior hierarchical
position.
Later, the Bank discusses the need to “promote public consensus” for its reforms
and development policy (World Bank 2005). As a publicly funded institution, the Bank
sees public approval of its policy as relevant (though not always necessary) to its mission.
The usage of consensus in this context becomes significant when one considers the role
of veto, or the individual’s ability to prevent a group action, within the formal consensus
model. Such an action can only be taken when an individual believes the action to be
taken violates the fundamental principles of the group. Within the Bank-CPA context,
the primary method of expression of a lack of public consensus, among both CSOs and
individuals, is street protest, and other physical or violent forms of resistance.
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Significantly, the Bank sees street protest as non-productive, and describes it in a
condescending tone, which again points to the Bank’s more powerful position: “There is
also little basis for the Bank to expect that constructive relations are possible or desirable
with obstructionist-minded groups, unless their aims and tactics change significantly…
The protestors have posed a dilemma for some of the Bank’s more constructive critics”
(World Bank 2005). The Bank also suggests that protesters oppose Bank actions only
because they are unaware of the Bank’s self-described non-political role as an advisor
and lender to its member states (World Bank 2005). In effect, the bank imposes its policy
on those below it because it knows what is best for global development and is willing to
use its superior power to do so.
The formal consensus model does somewhat validate the Bank’s view of street
protesters as irreconcilable with Bank goals. If the protesters do indeed believe Bank
actions violate the fundamental principles of society, as a consensus-based approach to
CSO-state conflict dictates, then negotiation might be impossible. Many protesters
(which often includes the CPA) unmistakably aim to block Bank actions. But the Bank
has enough power to circumvent the consensus process and to block any truly global
discussion of development policy.
Additionally, the language used to describe “protest” points out protest’s apparent
reactive nature. While Bank literature describes those who oppose its work solely as
“protesters,” many opposition CSOs describe their action using other, more positive
terms. The world “protest” further implies that bank opponents do not offer alternative
positive methods of development, but only attempt to block Bank actions for political
reasons. CPA literature frequently describes their anti-Bank campaigns as “direct
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action,” which suggests initiative rather than reaction. “Direct action” as a tactic for
social change does include a wider range of actions, such as graffiti or violent conflict,
but CPA’s anti-Bank campaigns mainly involve street protest, educational initiatives, and
other legal activities.
The Bank also creates a hierarchy of civil society organizations, from “radical
advocacy groups” (a commonly occurring term in Bank literature), such as anarchist and
communist groups, to “more constructive CSO critics” (World Bank 2005), such as
Oxfam and the World Council of Churches. The Bank has established the
Monterrey/Doha/Johannesburg agenda (MDJ), which calls for deepening ties with
“constructive” critics of the Bank. “These groups would include what some analysts
have termed as the ‘hearts’ –groups which advocate generally peaceful and constructive
approaches—or “reformers,” which are informed critics of the Bank but are also
interested in dialogue toward further reforming, not abolishing, the international financial
institutions” (World Bank).

The Bank on Development and Civil Society

The Bank understands the growing prominence of NGOs in the development and
human rights fields. While the Bank does not recognize it, the consensus process drives
these NGO networks. As Graeber (2004) writes, consensus-driven networks can
effectively grow within the shadow of a policy dominated world. But the Bank’s work
with CSOs does not represent a full acceptance of consensus networks as a method for
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fostering development. In fact, one could view the Bank’s partnership with CSOs and
attempts to involve them in its projects as cooption of these networks. As I described
earlier (in the NGO and Consensus sections of the first chapter), NGOs are subject to the
political and economic pressures of the societies in which they exist. The Bank’s ability
to engage, and possibly co-opt CSO partners serves as a testament to this reality.
In its publications and website, the Bank emphasizes its increasing work with
civil society, despite the fact that the majority of its projects are conceived and
implemented in coordination with its member states, with minimal input from CSOs.
Michael Goldman observes that the growing relationship between civil society and the
Bank benefits the Bank in multiple ways, some superficial and others substantial. He
notes the view of civil society, particularly from an anthropological perspective, as a
contemporary manifestation of the “local” (Goldman 2005). Rather than pursuing a
policy top-down administration from outside, the involvement of civil society
demonstrates that local actors are involved in the development process. Rhetorically,
civil society, democracy, globalization, and development appear together, and the
presence of one indicates that the others must also be involved. In interviews, Bank
officials utilized this rhetoric, effectively verifying this claim (Freestone and Reynolds
interviews).
Consequently, the Bank sees its involvement with civil society as non-political.
But a variety of factors prevent the Bank’s relationship with CSO’s to simply promote
“doing good.” Instead, the Bank’s relationship with CSOs descends into political
conflict. Carolyn Reynolds, Coordinator the Bank’s Global Civil Society Team,
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acknowledged to me the contradiction between the Bank’s mission and the Bank’s
difficulty in understanding the needs of local, minority, and indigenous populations:

The bank is much more politically astute than it used to be, but its still not as
politically astute as it should be and I don’t know if it ever will be…Because of
the mandate we were given initially, because…traditionally the bank has been
staffed by economists, people from finance ministries of other countries, and
because its main orientation is with government who has its own interest in
protecting its power we have been, historically, blind to the politics affecting the
environments in which we work. We are less…we are much smarter about it
now, but we still have some real constraints in that and that has to do with the
kind of organization we are. We are an intergovernmental organization (Reynolds
interview).

Reynolds has acknowledged that while the Bank attempts to meaningfully involve civil
society, a lack of local political awareness makes this effort almost impossible. As Fisher
argues (presented in the first chapter), the diverse relationships between NGOs and states
can not be generalized (1995).
If the Bank is to make a meaningful attempt at engaging civil society, it must
develop a significant local presence in its project regions. Reynolds described Bank
attempts to move country directors from Washington into their respective countries
(interview), but within the Philippines, Manila and the Cordillera remain very different
regions. Further complicating the relationship is the lack of horizontal integration among
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the various Bank divisions. Economists, Advisory Services (a legal arm which considers
the implications of local and international law), and the Civil Society Team all have
different perspectives on development projects and the engagement of civil society.
And even if the Bank does meaningfully engage some elements of civil society,
such as Transparency International and the World Council of Churches, I doubt it would
ever work with a group such as the CPA. Unless it adapts a perspective based more on
Philippine history, the Bank will not be able to understand the complex struggles over
land, indigenous identity, and the environment, which has given rise to groups like the
CPA. Considering that the Bank is a Western-dominated intergovernmental institution
that exists to draw peripheral states into global capitalist systems (this is unquestionably
its mission, whether or not this leads to development is the debatable issue), the Bank
would probably cease to exist if it were to adopt a peripheral, or even more extreme, an
indigenous perspective of development.
Given the CPA’s position as a politically marginalized NGO within a globally
marginalized state, there is little reason to think that collaboration between the Bank and
the CPA is possible. Such a partnership might be possible if the Bank were more
responsive to civil society, but the Bank’s structure limits the effects of civil society
consultation on Bank policy, as Reynolds revealed in her interview.
One could analyze the Bank’s probable unwillingness to work with an
organization such as the CPA within the framework of policy and consensus. The Bank’s
ability to work with NGOs represents the existence of the consensus model within the
policy-driven status quo. Coexistence can occur for multiple reasons, possibly because
the state views the NGO’s actions as “doing good,” and therefore non-political, or
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because the NGO has been co-opted by the state. However, in the case of the CPA, both
cooption and a perceivably non-political approach to advocacy seem unlikely.
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Chapter VII: The Bank and CPA: Doing Good and the Struggle to Rise
above Politics

Hilhorst has written that an NGO’s most important asset is its credibility (2003).
Credibility in its ability to complete its mission, which as a non-profit and nongovernmental organization must be to do good. Because of the NGO’s definitional
contrast with the state, one of the most powerful critiques of an NGO is to accuse it of
involvement in politics, to in effect accuse it of forsaking the economic and political
privileges it receives from the state in exchange for its pledge to do good. I view the
struggle of the NGO to portray itself as non-political as an element of the state-NGO
struggle: the NGO can engage in activities for the common good, but its activities can not
enter the political arena, basically, they cannot in any way challenge the political
authority of the state.
Such an understanding of the NGO’s mission to do good sheds further light on
the concept of human rights. Human rights can be viewed as a field of social
development that does not interfere with the mechanisms of control of the state. Conflict
arises when the state believes the NGO has deviated from its stated public mission to do
good. In the case of the United States, state-imposed consequences might include loss of
tax-exempt status as a private charity or financial penalties imposed by local or federal
authorities. In a highly militarized, dysfunctional state such as the Philippines,
consequences for upsetting the state-NGO balance are much more extreme. The
following section documents this conflict—of the supposed missions of the CPA as an
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NGO that works for the common good because of its indigenous heritage, and the Bank
as an institution that utilizes Western economic skills to promote the common good.
The CPA and the Bank conflict in two ways: since CPA’s founding, it has worked
to oppose two major World Bank funded infrastructure projects: the Chico River Dam
project and the San Roque Dam. This conflict has involved physical violence on both
sides, such as violent attempts by area residents to stop dam construction, and
militarization of the area by the Philippine government, which can be viewed as a Bank
agent. The other major arena of conflict is discursive. The CPA identifies most
government incursions into the Cordillera as neo-liberal, Bank inspired projects (neoliberal is a pejorative term, like imperialist). In describing the Chico River Dam project,
the CPA identifies an amalgamated, corporate-government-Bank opponent. Recounting
its activities in the 1980s: “This was during the Marcos dictatorship period, when the
government and its corporate partners pursued destructive projects in the Cordillera
region, coupled with worsening militarization and political repression” (CPA 2007 C).
For its part, the Bank blames opposition to its development projects as the work of
“radical advocacy groups” (Reynolds Interview, this term also appears in Bank
publications). In the Philippine context, “radical advocacy group” could refer to the
National Democratic Front and other communist groups that CPA critics accuse it of
colluding with. The Bank and CPA use each other as a catch-all, ideological enemy.
The Bank divides its civil society opponents into two distinct groups: constructive
critics who are open to dialogue, and non-productive adversaries, the “radical advocacy
groups” mentioned above. The Bank states that while its more constructive critics
engage in dialogue to improve Bank policy, its non-productive adversaries violently
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protest Bank actions without even fully understanding the Bank’s mission or ongoing
projects (World Bank 2005). Certainly, there are NGOs that fit perfectly into each of the
categories, such as Transparency International and the Global Justice Movement,
respectively (Transparency International works with governments to reduce corruption,
while the Global Justice Movement is a lose association of anarchist-inspired, antiglobalization activists). But the CPA does not fit exclusively into either of these
categories.
Adding to the perception of the CPA as a “radical advocacy group,” the CPA
participates regularly in anti-globalization protests, and CPA representatives have
traveled internationally to protest at WTO and Bank meetings. The CPA does not oppose
specific WTO policies; rather, it protests the WTO policies and its mission in general
(CPA 2005). These protests include acts of civil disobedience, such as the “die-in” at the
WTO Hong Kong Ministerial Conference in 2005. Quoting a CPA protester in Hong
Kong, the CPA website states: “Both the WTO and the GMA [Gloria Macapagal Arroyo]
should both be junked” (CPA 2005). The CPA does not oppose specific WTO policies, it
believes the WTO’s actions inherently conflict with the interests of CPA stakeholders.
The Bank is highly critical of protests against all international finance organizations,
suggesting that protesters are motivated by publicity rather than social change (World
Bank 2005).
A second step towards classification as a “radical advocacy group,” in the eyes of
the Bank, is its propensity to criticize international finance institutions and the
government of the Philippines as if they are equally culpable for the negative effects of
development projects. While the Bank would like to be seen as solely a technical
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consultant and lender (explained above in the World Bank section), the CPA considers
the Philippine government to be an agent of the Bank, implying that the Bank plays a
more active role than the central government in determining government policy in the
Cordillera. The CPA websites quotes a CPA supporter as saying that the Philippine
governments subservience to the WTO makes the government even more unpopular in
the Cordillera region (cite B). A second CPA report discusses the ongoing political
killings of leftist activists in the Philippines, presumably by the rogue elements of the
AFP. The report links the killing of one indigenous activist with the ADB through
describing the victims role in protesting the construction of the Laiban Dam, an ADBfunded project. Quoting the victim’s son, the report states:

‘They killed my father, they said he was an NPA but he was a leader of those
opposing Laiban Dam. He was killed by the military under Task Force
Panther…Today my brothers and I will continue to fight for our land that our
father began [sic].’ The Laiban Dam is a project of the Asian Development Bank
(ADB). Other cases of killings of indigenous leaders who were protesting and
leading actions of opposition against development projects, mining and forestry
projects were reported. (CPA 2007 B)

No direct linkage exists between the ADB and the AFP. They have drastically different
goals and stakeholders. Yet in the report the CPA effectively portrays the killers as
agents of the ADB. The report continues by citing residents of the Cordillera who have
been negatively affected by Bank infrastructure projects. The report blames the ADB,
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the Arroyo government, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. This position
would draw ire from the Bank, which describes itself as uninvolved in national politics.
Also, a large distance separates rogue AFP officers and Bank officials in Washington.
But the Cordillera region would not be as highly militarized if it were not for World Bank
and ADB projects.
From the perspective of the rural farmers affected by damning and other
infrastructure projects, a linkage between the Bank and AFP might appear undeniable.
Aside from the presence of an occasional military unit, almost no government presence is
detectable in many of the indigenous, rural, and mountainous areas of the Philippines.
Many Cordillera communities are accessible only by foot. But with the initiation of
large-scale infrastructure projects, the area became more militarized because of the threat
of sabotage by separatist groups(the NPA in the Cordillera, and Islamic groups in the
southern Philippines as well). The sudden appearance of both the heavy-handed AFP and
colossal Bank-funded projects, in contrast to the previous complete absence of even the
most basic government services, suggests a close relationship between the two. From
this perspective, it would not be illogical to blame the Bank for increasing AFP violence.
The CPA has also referred on its website to violent resistance against
development projects, which it describes as a “vital ingredient in the people’s struggle” in
its report on damming projects in the Cordillera. The report, titled “A History of
Resistance: The Cordillera Mass Movement Against the Chico Dam and Cellophil
Resources Corporation,” frames the violent resistance to the Bank-funded Chico Dam
Project as a triumph of indigenous culture over outside interference. Discussing the
armed resistance: “This was but a logical step for these warrior societies in the escalation
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of the struggle for the defense of ancestral land and their self-determination to continue
their existence as indigenous communities” (CPA 2007 D). The anti-dam campaign
succeeded in preventing the Bank from proceeding with the project.
Each organization uses a variety of tactics to attack the legitimacy narrative –the
“doing good” narrative—of the other organization while supporting its own credibility. 16
The Philippine state radicalizes the CPA by suggesting the CPA illicitly works with
violent communist insurgent groups. The Bank also attacks NGO critics and popular
protests at its meetings alleging ties with anarchist or uninformed student organizations.
In response, the CPA questions the Bank’s self-appointed role as a global development
expert, and has questioned the Bank’s motives, suggesting that big business and
American foreign policy control the Bank’s actions more than a genuine desire for
development. In each criticism, the CPA and Bank accuse the other of deviating from
their missions to do good. The accusations are based on supposed deviations from the
NGOs social obligation of public service.
In many ways the CPA overtly engages in political activities. The question is
whether the wider public assumes this to be a deviation from its general mission as an
NGO to “do good.” In the contemporary context, its staunch opposition to the Arroyo
government and close association with leftist political parties has drawn critics’ attention.
However, the CPA does not cast this opposition as politically motivated; rather, they
point to the regime’s corruption scandals and human rights abuses as non-political
reasons for this opposition.

16

While the Bank is not an NGO, both Freestone and Reynolds asserted in interviews that the Bank is
obligated, as a publicly-funded institution, to work for the public good.

Robbins 90
The CPA also cites indigenous heritage as another “non-political” reason for its
opposition to government and Bank projects. CPA publications include land rights,
traditional lifestyles, respect for the environment, and cultural preservation as crucial
factors in their opposition to ADB and Bank infrastructure projects (CPA 2007 D).
Using the language of indigenousness allows the CPA to advocate for positions that the
Philippine public and international sympathizers might otherwise consider too radical,
because it allows the CPA to remove itself from the left vs. right spectrum of political
conflict. But the invocation of human rights language centered around indigenous
heritage allows for the CPA to counter pro-development arguments by discussing the
“right” to self-determination.
The Bank also claims to follow a mission to “do good,” and uses this claim to
justify its development projects, even, in some countries, in the face of widespread public
opposition. Such a situation appears to be a contradiction: can the Bank really “do
good,” if those who are to benefit from its projects strongly oppose it? Chandler (2001)
writes that Western-based human rights and development organizations attempt to
discredit this concern by blaming opposition on corrupt and politicized Third World
elites. Chandler writes “The citizens of non-Western states were seen as easily
manipulated by their corrupt and inefficient elites and ill-versed in the skills of political
decision making and economic exchange” (Chandler 2001). Indeed, the capitalist system
views the market as an inherently efficient mechanism, so from the Bank’s perspective,
local interference with market function presents the only explanation for failure of neoliberal Bank policy.
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The Bank’s self-affirming view of its policy, and its dominant location within this
system effectively make Bank policy non-negotiable. Bourdieu supports such a claim,
describing neo-liberalism as a “strong discourse” because “it has behind it all the powers
of a world of power relations which helps make it as it is” (Quoted in Silvey 2005). In
her interview, Reynolds confirmed this position by describing the Bank’s prior-informed
consultation policy as only a formality (interview).
The irreconcilability of Bank policy with the CPA’s consensus-based advocacy
has significantly contributed to violence in the Cordillera: the American and Philippine
governments see the Bank as a successful economic institution that will develop the
Cordillera. The regional history of violence, the CPA’s alliance with opposition political
parties, and the national government’s membership in American-inspired neo-liberal
institutions all exasperate this conflict.

The CPA as a Constructive Development Partner

As I have described, the CPA is highly antagonistic toward the Bank and other
international finance institutions, denouncing them for their greed and the harm they have
caused to the Cordillera region. But at the same time, it also attempts to meaningfully
engage these same organizations through “more constructive” means. Returning to
Fisher (1995), one must remember that NGO-state relationships constantly evolve, and
can not be captured within one paradigm of violence or cooperation. The CPA lobbies
international finance organizations though informational campaigns, and draws upon an
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international network of NGO supporters to add credibility to its efforts. Often, these
coalitions enlist technical advisors and NGOs with expertise in major infrastructure
projects to help lobby the Bank. For example, The CPA joined 34 NGOs from 18
countries in lobbying the Asian Development Bank to modify its policy on Large Water
Resources Projects. This coalition included Western-based NGOs that the Bank views as
“constructive development partners,” including Oxfam (CPA 2004). The diversity of
advocacy techniques, from protest at Bank meetings, to networking with more
economically and politically powerful Western-based NGOs, and lobbying using
technical experts demonstrates the difficulty of classifying the CPA within the Bank’s
framework of NGO advocacy as either “constructive” or “counterproductive.”
An additional point related to the debate over productive and non-productive
advocacy is that “non-productive” advocacy (in the eyes of the Bank), such as street
protest, can have latent benefits. In discussing the large, and sometimes violent
resistance to the Chico Dams project, the CPA points out that successful protest can have
positive effects on the involved communities. The CPA report describes the “greater
unity among the various ethnolinguistic groups, and tribes in the region” (E). The report
continues to describe a series of peace pacts (Kalinga vochong) that resulted from the
unified campaign against the Chico Dams project. The CPA describes the process as a
triumph of indigenous methods over foreign interference.

The Marcos dictatorship, with its World Bank funding for the project, was caught
flat-footed. They did not reckon with the strong communal ethos still existing
between the Bontok and Kalinga, which allowed them to forge agreements among
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the binodngan –peacepact – practicing communities along the Chico river in
opposition to the project. Nor did they expect the people to muster widespread
national and international support. Because of the sheer determination and
courage of the dam-affected peoples to stop the project by all means, the World
Bank decided to withdraw its funding for the dam project. In fact, it was the
experience of the World Bank on the Chico Dam that it formulated its operational
guidelines of projects affecting indigenous peoples (E).

The CPA suggests that the Bank formulated its indigenous peoples policy because of
extensive protest in the Cordillera, which is an important, productive step toward
increasing understanding between the Bank and advocacy organizations such as the CPA.
It demonstrates the positive and long-lasting results of protest rather than engagement.
The coexistence of the policy and consensus models has multiple facets. At times
they support one another to create more effective development and human rights
frameworks, or they can function concurrently in different spheres. In the case of CPA
and Bank development and rights practice in the Cordillera, policy and consensus conflict
violently. The concluding chapter will discuss the role of anthropology in lessening this
conflict and promoting more effective rights and development practices in the Cordillera.
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Chapter VIII: Discussion

At the beginning of this thesis, I presented two perspectives from which to view
human rights advocacy and development: policy and consensus. I also analyzed the
relationship between states and NGOs active in these fields, and addressed their motives
for pursuing human rights and development work. One important recognition that
emerges from this discussion is that these issues—policy, consensus, the state, and the
NGO—are contested terms. They constantly evolve, rising and falling in contrast to one
another. Globally, they are enacted in diverse ways—there is no typical NGO-state
relationship or development process.
In the first two chapters I constructed the framework necessary to approach the
relationship between the NGO, state, and multilateral organization from an
anthropological perspective. The following chapters covering the Cordillera People’s
Alliance and World Bank have placed this discussion in the Philippine context. They
have demonstrated how the state-NGO relationship in the Philippines is marred by a long
history of imperialism, political violence and authoritarian governments. The
multifaceted relationship between the United States and the Philippines further
complicates the curious relationship between the Philippine state, the CPA, and the Bank.
Political conditions unique to the Philippines, such as the entry of the Bank into the
Cordillera region under the Marcos regime, his legacy, and ongoing insurgencies, have
raised the stakes in this ongoing struggle.
But similar conflicts occur around the globe. The political ties between the
Philippines and the United States, the Marcos regime, and the long history of colonialism
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in the Philippines have complicated the relationships between the Bank, the United
States, the Philippines, and the CPA, but development bank projects disproportionately
affect indigenous and marginalized peoples, often detrimentally. This neglect is a
product of the Bank’s focus, an institution that often forgets that economics should serve
only as a means to benefit actual people. The Bank institutionally marginalizes its Civil
Society Team, and contributes to the typically oppressive relationship between the
world’s states and indigenous peoples.
This chapter analyzes the role of anthropology within development and human
rights. Understanding what anthropology can offer within the Cordillera context and to
the Bank, CPA, and government of the Philippines will help indicate how to de-escalate
the ongoing violent and discursive conflict. I will also consider what steps anthropology
must take within human rights and development debates. Through analysis of how
institutions such as the state and the NGO influence the construction of identity within
the Cordillera, anthropology could be used to create a more effective model of
development and human rights.

The Role of Anthropology

Anthropology can play an important role in deciphering the complex relationships
present in the Bank-CPA conflict, as well as helping elucidate the issues at stake in other
collisions between “local” advocacy groups and global financial institutions. The
convoluted histories of the Cordillera and the Bank can only be contextualized from an
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anthropological perspective. The Bank uses economics to approach problems of
development, and the state focuses more on political relationships, but for Cordillera
residents, questions of identity underlie any political or economic concerns.
Wider global conflicts overshadow the specifics of the Bank-CPA relationship.
The Bank and CPA interact within global systems dominated by unclear yet powerful
interactions between the state, multilateral organization, and the NGO. The
contradictions within this relationship have grown as globalization redefines state
boundaries and, in conjunction, the non-governmental sector. The overlapping human
rights and developmental systems of policy and consensus also background the BankCPA relationship. The Bank functions largely within the realm of policy; policy being
top-down regulations enforced through legalistic means by hegemonic institutions. Its
member states, other development banks, and the UN are all policy-driven. In contrast,
the CPA works to exert its influence through the consensus process. It draws upon a
constituency of over 120 peoples organizations, and a network of international partners to
do so. Graeber (2004) argues that policy and consensus systems can coexist, and the
current cooperation between the CPA and the policy-driven State Department
demonstrate this partnership.
Clearly, however, the global mechanisms for protecting human rights and
fostering sustainable development do not function perfectly. As I have mentioned earlier,
no inherent conflict exists between the stated missions of Bank and CPA—development
and indigenous rights could even promote one another—yet this conflict has led to
widespread human rights abuses in the Cordillera. Graeber discusses the duality of the
state, and might blame its contradictory nature, its idealistic goals and social control
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functions, for Bank-CPA conflict. Yet Fisher (1995) has argued that one can not
generalize NGO-state relations; in the United States, for example, NGO-state conflict
does not produce widespread human rights abuses.
Anthropologists define their advocacy in terms of speaking out, offering guidance
and knowledge. Etymologically, such an application of the term advocacy is correct, but
if the purpose of advocacy is to produce change, anthropologists’ actions fall far short.
Graeber’s call for anthropological advocacy follows this dominant pattern. He writes that
anthropologists must “Look at those who are creating viable alternatives… and then offer
those ideas back… as gifts” (2004). But Graeber’s commentary is not a call for change
because anthropologists already occupy this role: my perusal of the Annual Review of
Anthropology and other prominent anthropological publications revealed several articles
on the need for anthropologists to speak out on a variety of issues.
The problem with this form of advocacy is that it positions anthropologists as
commentators, and not as actors. The actors are the subjects that anthropologists
constantly study and “speak” down to. If horizontal networks are an effective tool for
promoting human rights, and a growing number of social scientists support this view
(Keck and Sikkink 1998), than the current position of the anthropology establishment
amounts to a preference to discuss the status quo rather than change it. Anthropologists
must involve themselves in activist networks, just like all other members of society.
Involvement includes engaging development banks and governments, not only
indigenous groups and NGOs. Wright (1988) discusses the movement within
anthropology to provide a voice for, indigenous “fourth world” groups, and the
anthropological support of indigenous advocacy campaigns. She traces this movement
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within the discipline as a reaction to anthropology’s historic role of facilitating colonial
expansion. A significant role exists for anthropologists in working with local NGOs and
indigenous populations, but anthropologists must engage all actors within the
development and rights fields. Working with and helping provide a voice for the
subaltern is important, but creating more equitable indigenous peoples policies on the
state and global levels might have a greater effects.
The World Bank is a leading contemporary institution of Western expansion.
Some anthropologists do participate in the Bank’s work, but anthropology has not fully
engaged the Bank or other multilateral financial institutions. Hazards exist in doing so,
such as the cooption of anthropology as an independent discipline, a loss of academic
credibility, and a loss of the bottom-up perspective unique to anthropology. Yet
engaging only the subaltern, or in the context of this thesis only the CPA, a much more
amicable and needy partner, carries a major hazard as well—marginalization of the
discipline. Anthropologists will not stop destructive development and rights violations
by partnering only with the weaker of the two conflicting parties.
To facilitate effective communication and lessen conflict between the two,
anthropology must engage both sides of the conflict. As contradictory as it might sound,
anthropology must involve itself in reconstructing (or deconstructing) Bank and
government policies. Anthropology must work with the Bank to adapt local perspectives
to development and rights issues, as well as work with the CPA to create effective
methods of global engagement, so that they do not fulfill the Bank’s image of the Fourth
World as needy and helpless recipients of development. Rather than protesting the
Bank’s existence, anthropologists could do a greater public service through conveying
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that Bank support is often unwanted—and perhaps counterproductive—in many regions
of the world.
Anthropologists, as members of the Western elite, occupy a position that allows
them to influence the policy of global institutions much more significantly than the
position of groups such as the CPA. 17 To present an anecdotic example, I easily arranged
meetings with multiple State Department and high-level Bank officials as a part of this
research process. Fourth World advocacy organizations do not have access to the
personal and academic networks that facilitated these interviews. Anthropologists can use
these networks, their greater political and economic capital, and smaller personal risks (in
contrast to speaking out in violent areas such as the Cordillera), to engage, rather than
simply oppose, organizations such as the Bank. As I mentioned in the second chapter,
Merry (2006) addresses the role of anthropology in transnational human rights networks.
She notes that often these networks carry Western ideas of human rights to the
indigenous context, and that anthropologists also help express the views of indigenous
groups on the global level. Given the ongoing conflict within the Cordillera,
anthropologists must play an important role in facilitating communication between the
Bank and CPA.
Engagement offers a variety of opportunities for anthropologists; there is no
uniform position that anthropologists can assume. Advocacy networks function because
of the diversity of actors they convene; each actor offers unique abilities, reaches a
different constituency, and carries a different level of moral credibility. Anthropology,
despite its grandiose self-image, is only one node within these networks.
17

This is my assumption, and it might not be true in all cases. But anthropology is a product of
universities, bastions of the elite. In contrast, indigenous peoples are often described as residents of the
Fourth World.
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Of greater importance is the question of whether anthropologists are wanted or
needed in conflict situations such as in the Cordillera. Ultimately, I believe
anthropologists should engage such situations, but let us consider several related issues.
In a way, anthropology’s belief that it will aid indigenous communities through its
presence and expertise is not unlike the Bank’s insistence that its policies will lead to
development. Both claims arise from self-described benevolent Western “experts”
attempting to aid marginalized communities. Additionally, both claim to not impose their
views upon their subjects: the Bank offers only funding and technical advice, and it
consults with affected populations; likewise, anthropologists are culturally sensitive
observers who aid their subjects of study. The history of both the Bank and anthropology
refute these claims of benevolence. Anthropologists have accompanied and often
facilitated a long history of Western colonial expansion (Wright 1988), while recipient
states of Bank aid are arguably not any more developed than those that shun it.
Despite these similarities, I identify one important difference between the
discipline of anthropology and the actions of the Bank: the Bank is a hierarchical
institution that imposes its will through non-negotiable policy, while anthropologists
typically engage their field of study through horizontal networks formed around
consensus principles. The Bank provides little recourse for indigenous peoples and other
stakeholders negatively affected by its policy decisions. Moreover, the Bank and its
member states use violence to suppress opposition to its policy. Anthropologists, by
engaging marginalized communities through consensus networks, present little or no
threat. Anthropologists must meaningfully contribute to consensus-based advocacy
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networks. The participation of anthropologists within these networks strengthens them,
making them a more viable alternative to policy institutions.
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